

An exploration of the unification policy in West Germany during the Brandt period

Yujie Gao

Department of Public Administration, Shandong Normal University, Jinan, China

*Corresponding author: 201929010149@stu.sdnu.edu.cn

Abstract. After the Haldensianism of Adenauer, Brandt decided to change his usual aggressive Eastern diplomacy and made diplomatic attempts with East Germany, Eastern Europe, and even the Soviet Union and put forward the New Eastern Policy as his fundamental policy of reunification. From the 1960s to the 1970s, West Germany marked a turning point in the resolution of the German question.

Keywords: New Oriental Policy, German reunification, Foreign policy

1. Introduction

On 21 November 1941, Churchill proposed that after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain should focus on preventing another potential attack by Germany, especially Prussia. This proposal was endorsed by the Soviet leader Stalin, and then Roosevelt also agreed that Germany should be allowed to exist in several parts. However, at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' meeting in October 1943, the common interests of the three countries on the question of Germany gradually separated and certain policy differences arose. Therefore, a decision on the partition of Germany was delayed and European Advisory Committee was set up at this meeting to have a further study on it[1]. The European Advisory Council aimed at providing the three countries with feasible proposals rather than deciding directly on the course of events. The establishment of EAC was in fact a disguise to cover up the differences or to avoid contradictions among them. The Tehran meeting a month later similarly showed that the three powers were in agreement on a partition, but could not agree on how to proceed.

When time advanced to the Yalta Conference in 1945, victory in the war was close at hand, the wariness and defensiveness had replaced the fear of Nazi Germany that had once existed, and conflicting interests prevented them from reaching a substantive arrangement acceptable to all three parties on the major political issue of the partition of Germany. On the other hand, neither one of the triumvirates was willing to take the moral responsibility of partitioning Germany alone. The Soviet Red Army was the first to mark victory on the roof of the Reichstag on 30 April 1945, the wave of communism was gradually moving westwards, the contradictions between social systems and ideological oppositions were intensifying, and neither the Soviet-occupied nor the Allied-occupied zones were able to extend their spheres of influence further on German territory. Under the Yalta Agreement, American, British and French forces occupied the western territories of Germany, while Soviet troops were entrenched in the eastern territories of Germany. The capital Berlin which was in the Soviet-occupied zone at the time was also separated by the four powers. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the Allies decided to treat German with a system of partition occupation and unified control [2]. On 23 May 1949, by the promulgation of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, federal Germany was established. In response, the Soviet Union proclaimed the establishment of the GDR in October of the same year. The ideological struggle and the US-Soviet rivalry made German reunification a distant prospect, starting a 44-year division between the two German states.

Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, decided to turn completely to the Western camp led by the United States. And he pursued the promotion of the unification of the two Germanies through the suppression of East German power. The consolidation and revival of West Germany under the communist threat of the Soviet Union had to rely on Western support and

assistance. On the one hand, he revitalized the market economy which greatly stimulated the rise of a post-war consumer market and had a positive effect on other areas such as industry. On the other hand, he persuaded the Allies not to dismantle German industry in large numbers and accepted economic aid from the Marshall Plan to help West Germany's post-war economy to recover rapidly. Therefore, the rate of economic growth in West Germany was once described as a miracle of economic growth. In the post-war period, class tensions were particularly pronounced. So West Germany tried to set up a series of social security systems aimed at increasing employment rates, guaranteeing better medical conditions and educational resources, and introducing a new currency to stabilize prices. And these policies worked really well. In order to win the support of the working people, more attention was paid to the legal rights and status of workers, which led to the protection of their political interests, enlisted the hearts and minds of the working people, and led to an increase in productivity. Adenauer hoped that the Western countries could support German reunification according to its economic power and that the Soviet Union would inevitably make concessions to Germany in the face of Western power. But he failed to realize that the goal of reunifying Germany under the bipolar Yalta system could not be achieved without cooperation with the Soviet Union.

2. A comparison of social and economic conditions in East and West Germany during Brandt's period

After the Second World War, Germany was split into East and West Germany with the support of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, and the two became examples of the sharp contradictions and great differences between the two camps of capitalism and socialism. As a result, the two countries had their own post-war economic and social development strategies and achieved different results. A comparison of the post-war development policies and their socio-economic results can provide a better understanding of the context in which the New East policy was designed and implemented.

2.1 Socioeconomic conditions in East Germany

After the division, East Germany accounted for 30% of the total territories and 21% of the population. Under the influence of the Soviet Union, the East German government designed and implemented the domestic political system imitating the Soviet Union and enforced socialist public ownership. The Soviet Union's economic plunder of East Germany continued even after collecting large amounts of war reparations. Many large enterprises, big banks, insurance companies, coal and steel, and power base industries were nationalized. Since 1950, the implementation of hand industry cooperatives and agricultural collectivization has continuously expanded the share of public ownership. At the same time, the acquisition and exchange of goods are strictly in proportion to the distribution. By Brandt's time, the economic and industrial structure of East Germany was seriously unbalanced, the quantity and quality of consumer goods supply in East Germany were far lower than that in West Germany, and the living standard of the people in East Germany was also greatly different from that in West Germany. So, the unbalanced economic and living situation gave the New Oriental Policy a chance to closer ties with East Germany.

2.2 Socioeconomic conditions in West Germany

After the war, Adenauer adopted a policy of economic development centered on the idea of strengthening[3]. West Germany inherited most of Germany's industrial facilities, and with the aid of the Marshall Plan given by the United States, the gross national product of the Federal Republic of Germany rose from DM 119 billion in 1951 to DM 679 billion in 1970, an increase of 5.7 times. Four major laws were passed: the Currency Act, the Currency Issuance Act, the Exchange Act, and the Fixed Accounts Act. With these four main laws, as well as a number of implementing regulations, such as the later Act on the Regulation and Price Policy after the Currency Reform,

West Germany was able to reduce the amount of currency issued. At the same time, West Germany implemented fiscal and tax policies to promote investment and competition policies to face the world market, which achieved good results and opened the curtain for the subsequent economic miracle. However, the Federal Republic of Germany did not confine itself to the domestic market and actively developed its foreign trade. Thanks to the high level of technology and the high quality of its products, the competitiveness of West German goods increased considerably. From 1947 to 1970, the Federal Republic's export volume increased 144.8 times. Although the economic power of the Federal Republic of Germany was greatly enhanced, it was still under the control of the USA and the U.S.S.R. and did not have independence in its foreign affairs. This political and economic mismatch prompted Federal Germany to try independent foreign policy, which also started the formulation of the New Oriental Policy.

3. Brandt's unified policy analysis

3.1 The theoretical basis of the New Oriental Policy

3.1.1 Dachtheorie

The theory adopted by Adenauer was based on the Halstein doctrine, that is, Federal Germany is Germany, and the GDR does not have legitimate status in the international community. Also, Federal Germany broke off diplomatic relations with countries with which East Germany has diplomatic relations (excluding the Soviet Union). However, such diplomatic measures have become more and more unsuitable for the international situation over time, so Brandt adopted the Roof theory (Dachtheorie) proposed by Friedrich August von der Heydte as his guiding ideology after coming to power. That is, East Germany and West Germany are only represented to a certain limit, neither is a complete state[4]. Therefore, Brandt called for "positive coexistence" between East and West Germany.

3.1.2 The Power Balance Theory

The Power Balance Theory refers to the equilibrium of power, where one country or region is able to maintain its own interests by making another country or region equal in power to its neighbors or competitors, in order to prevent the emergence of dominant power[5]. The three Berlin crises and the Cuban Missile Crisis showed that the United States and the Soviet Union had moved away from very violent confrontation to a more peaceful approach to maintaining the status quo. West Germany, in its bipolar situation, should also adapt to the changing international situation.

3.2 The contents of the New Oriental Policy

The core of New Oriental policy is "Seeking change through mutual acceptance", which mainly includes four aspects:

- (1) The Federal Republic of Germany recognizes the international legitimacy of the Democratic Republic of Germany, as well as the Od-Nice border between East Germany and Poland
- (2) It was proposed that the reunification of Germany was an international political issue, which could not be excluded from the Soviet Union and could only be solved through joint consultation with the Soviet Union
- (3) Strengthen ties with eastern European countries and restore the normalization of East-West relations through diplomatic means
- (4) Promoting regional peace through the establishment of CSCE

3.3 The signing of the Moscow Treaty and the Basic Treaty

3.3.1 The signing of the Moscow Treaty

Brandt's first task in pursuing his "New Oriental Policy" was to engage with the Soviet Union and try to establish diplomatic relations[6]. The Soviet Union regarded West Germany as the secret schemer of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and believed that West Germany was trying to follow the US policy of peaceful evolution to promote regime change in Eastern Europe.

As a result, relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union had been strained while the unification of the two German states could not be achieved without the Soviet Union, so diplomatic efforts to strengthen friendly relations with the Soviet Union became a priority. The Soviet Union had spent too much energy and money on the political democratization of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and on the border dispute with China over Ussuri in 1969. Therefore, it was in no position to accept a new cold or hot war with the United States in Germany. These could be viewed as the reasons that the Soviet side was also in urgent need of a "détente" with the Federal Republic of Germany to find a new solution to the German problem. Barr and Gromyko, as diplomatic representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union respectively, negotiated and revised the Moscow Treaty from 1969 to August 1970. The treaty included an agreement between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany to settle the German question by peaceful means rather than by force, the recognition of the Austro-German-Nice border by the Federal Republic of Germany and the international legitimacy of the GDR. The signing of this treaty transformed the previous Soviet-German rivalry and opened the way for the Federal Republic of Germany to negotiate peace with other Eastern European countries.

3.3.2 The signing of the Basic Treaty

But a new difficulty emerged with the German question: the acceptance and recognition of the international identity of the GDR deviated from the unification of the two Germanies. After the Berlin crisis, East Germany not only built the famous Berlin Wall but even adopted the doctrine of extinction represented by Hans Nawiasky and Hans Kelsen, which identified East and West Germany as two new and separate states, wanting to draw a line between two Germanies and separate them completely[7]. Brandt also had his own views on the relationship between the two Germanies, arguing that the German nation had nurtured a national culture and national consciousness as the same ethnicity for they share the same language and customs. Although East Germany and West Germany were now under different ideologies and social systems, there was a strong cultural bond for reunification. In order to weaken the negative effects of the Berlin Wall and border control regulations, the Basic Treaty between the two Germanies was signed on 21 December 1972. The main elements of the treaty were: firstly, both sides would recognize each other as counterparts and maintain friendly relations with each other and do not cross it at will while respecting each other's right to participate independently in international affairs. Secondly, the two Germanies have discussed follow-up cooperation in the areas of political communication, economic exchanges, and the travel of people, so as to properly resolve the separation of family members caused by the division of Germany. At the same time, East and West Germany also established permanent representatives for each other as a sign of cooperation. In the 1970s, around four million people from the Federal Republic of Germany traveled to the German Democratic Republic, and six times as many came from West Berlin as from the German Democratic Republic; there were also nearly 13 million people from the Federal Republic of Germany living in the German Democratic Republic. Trade between the two German states also intensified, reaching more than 10 billion marks at the beginning of the 1980s, which meant that the two economies became even more inseparable.

3.4 Brandt's personal diplomacy

During World War II, the German invaded Poland, established the concentration camp exemplified by Auschwitz, and killed a large number of Jews. For Poland, the history of Nazi Germany was still fresh in its memory. In December 1970, Brandt launched his mission to Poland to ease diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia. At the outset, Brandt's proposal to re-establish normal diplomatic and trade relations between Germany and Poland was not well received by the Polish authorities. However, Brandt's unexpected kneeling in front of the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising confused not only his entourage but also the Polish journalists and officials present. But Brandt's kneeling had a positive effect, as Polish officials changed their attitude to the

offer Brandt had made, and the Treaty of Warsaw was signed. It marked the beginning of a formal normalization of diplomatic relations between Germany and Poland.

On 3 September 1971, the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union reached an agreement in Berlin, and the following year the Treaty on the Foundations of the Two German States was signed between East and West Germany. In December 1973 the German-Czech Treaty, the Treaty of Prague, was signed, and soon afterward the Federal Republic of Germany issued communiqués on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria respectively.

4. Analysis of the effect of Brandt's unification policy

4.1 The meaning of the Polish kneel

If West Germany had stayed with the Hallstein doctrine of the Adenauer period, then in the treacherous international political situation of the 1960s and 1970s, when the two sides were in conflict, East and West Germany would have been the first to be engaged in battle just as the Berlin crises had shown. Brandt clearly recognized the need to find a more flexible path for West Germany by repositioning West Germany politically and planning beyond the confines of the USA and USSR. Therefore, easing relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe became the possible solution. It had a potential effect on the unification of the two Germanies and was also in line with the peaceful evolutionary strategy of NATO and the US in particular.

Poland, as one of the Warsaw member states, is a country bordering Germany and is still haunted by its history of aggression because of the German blitzkrieg annexation of Poland during the Second World War. Although West Germany was admitted into the arms of the West, its international status was still up in the air. If West Germany could successfully manage its relations with Poland, it could be used as a springboard to further develop its relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. For Brandt, the "New Eastern Policy" would also have smaller resistance to its implementation and ultimately normalize relations between the two Germanies. The Polish Kneel was an important diplomatic event as it showed the world that Germany was not a fascist Germany anymore.

4.2 Eased relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

With China-Soviet relations broken and the bipolar pattern still in place, it became imperative for the Soviet Union to develop friendly relations with Western European countries in order to avoid the fragmentation of political power. For West Germany, it had to find other countries' support on the German problem instead of the aid from America because the broken promises of the previous US multilateral nuclear force program alarmed them [8]. Brandt's priority was how to conduct an independent and autonomous foreign policy to a limited extent. Developing relations with Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union would have been a better counterweight to US' control and direction. West Germany's contacts with Eastern Europe in the late 1960s were halted by the Soviet Union for fear of "liberalization" in the Eastern European countries, and the democratization movement within the Communist bloc in this area was detrimental to Soviet authority. This also made it impossible for West Germany to cooperate with Eastern Europe without the consent of the Soviet Union. However, German-Soviet relations were positively influenced by the New Oriental Policy which alleviated the difficulty of the external relation of solving the German problem. At the same time, the benefits of German-Soviet relations made cooperation more comprehensive, and closer. For example, it was difficult for West Germany to meet its internal needs for resources for its development with only locally sourced industrial raw materials, and much of it still had to be imported to fill the gap. The Soviet Union, as a major resource country, was able to strengthen economic cooperation and trade relations between the two countries through a win-win formula of "I provide the resources, you provide the technology". In terms of culture, Gorbachev's "new thinking" had learned from the détente of the Federal Republic of Germany, which, after the

convergence of the "peaceful evolution" movement, accelerated the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany.

West Germany's engagement with eastern Europe went more smoothly after it had opened its links with the Soviet Union. As the Warsaw Pact members were generally economically disadvantaged, West Germany took advantage of this to offer trade concessions to Eastern European countries, and Czechoslovakia, for example, quickly accepted West Germany's offer. The easing of relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also paved the way for the next step in the easing of relations between the two Germanies[9].

4.3 The return of the German question to the international political agenda

German problem was not only an internal issue but also the product of a complex international situation processed during the Cold War. With the implementation of the New Oriental Policy, the prospects for political development in West Germany have been expanded. The normalization of relations between the two Germanies has been able to strengthen bilateral trade and improve the understanding between people from the two sides. The difference in living standards was to some extent attractive to the people of East Germany, which was the main reason why East Germans fled to West Germany after the rise of the German problem. This provided the internal conditions for the eventual reunification of the two Germanies.

With the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the Warsaw Pact, the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement, and the Foundation Treaty, Brandt elevated the international status of West Germany and integrated the German question into the situation in Eastern Europe and the bipolar confrontation, which meant that the initiative to solve the German question was no longer in the hands of the two great powers, the US and the Soviet Union, but in the hands of the Germans themselves. This also provided the external conditions for the eventual reunification of the two Germanies.

5. The Problem of Brandt's Unification Policy

5.1 Not included in the European integration process

In the design and implementation of the New Oriental Policy, Brandt did not realize that the German question could not be solved without West Europe and that the question of German unification was of great importance to the security of Europe in general and Western Europe in particular. The economic power of West Germany, also known as the "Rhine miracle", drove Brandt to gain political status by means of economic status. However, It's a national security concern for neighbors like France. Even if Brandt had stated at the beginning of his New Oriental Policy that he was proactively promoting European integration because Germany needed a strong community and a proactive German foreign policy towards Western Europe to balance and enhance Germany's current actions in the East, France would still have been extremely concerned about the possibility that a renewed European integration would allow Germany to become a larger player in the EEC. Britain, on the other hand, has a tradition of continental parity and it was wondering whether a second Hitler will emerge if West Germany is allowed to grow in political status or international discourse, so Britain wants to keep the German question frozen in the European diplomatic arena alone. The development of German-American relations and the gradual independence of West Germany in the international made Britain and France feel that it has long been different from the past. Most importantly, which side the two Germans would fall to after reunification or whether they would choose neutrality had a certain degree of influence on the strength of the East and West camps. The change in Germany's position was an important influencing factor in the East-West hegemony and had a profound impact on the political and economic development of each country.

So if the New Oriental Policy incorporates the normalization of relations between West Germany and East Germany, will there be a new "chemical reaction" by using the Western system of obligations to restrict the reunification of Germany? In the gestation phase of the New Oriental

Policy, Brandt had in fact taken into account the fear that Germany might deviate from European integration and related problems. Therefore, the "Davignon Report" on European political cooperation and the "Vienna Report" on economic cooperation enabled Germany to establish cooperation mechanisms with Western Europe. This also relieved Germany of the burden of being at the forefront of the Cold War. However, these cooperations did not define the direction of a united Germany, nor did they integrate the process of reunification with European integration, so Britain and France remained skeptical and apprehensive, creating external factors that were not conducive to reunification. The policy of strength under the Adenauer period showed that while strength was important for the reunification of the two Germanies, external factors could also hinder the process. The creation of a favorable external environment was conducive to resolving the unification issue.

5.2 Resistance from the two superpowers, the US and the USSR

In the 1960s and 1970s, the US and the Soviet Union shifted the stage of the Cold War to Third World countries, for example, Vietnam War and the Cuban crisis. This also meant that Germany was no longer a crucial part of the East-West rivalry and that German unification was becoming less possible. For the Soviet Union, the East German riots of the 1950s were still fresh in their minds, the Warsaw camp in Eastern Europe was frequently democratizing, and a reunification of the two German states by West Germany would have further reduced the overall strength of the Warsaw Pact. As for West Germany, the international interests brought about by American power politics did not always fit the needs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

This is why the new Eastern policy reflects a sense of trepidation. The Brandt government, for example, pursued this policy by trying to achieve diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on the one hand, while at the same time repeatedly emphasizing the non-recognition of the GDR in international law on the other.

5.3 Lack of measures to raise awareness of national identity

On 28 October 1969, Brandt proposed in his policy program the phrase "one nation, two states", since both East and West Germany were part of the German nation. But for the people of East Germany, if West Germany did not explicitly want reunification, it felt like a cheeky attempt to rub up against the welfare of their richer brothers if they spontaneously offered to integrate into West Germany. The New Oriental Policy was more concerned with the political, economic, and diplomatic relations between West Germany and the East and West. It did not do enough to promote national cohesion between East and West Germany. Moreover, a prolonged period of division has led the East and West Germans to accept and get used to the fact that they are divided. The scholar Rudolf Bernhardt argued at the 1979 Congress of State Law Scholars that the 'roof theory', with 'Germany as a whole at its core, was outdated and that the GDR was unquestionably an independent state[10]. By the 1980s, the Federal Republic of Germany was full of all kinds of appeasement remarks on German-German relations. The mainstream public opinion even believed that unification was "unrealistic" and that it was a necessary choice to accept the "continuous state of dualization"[11].

6. Measures of the Unification Problem

6.1 Promote US-German cooperation and open communication between the Soviet Union and Germany

The formulation of the New Oriental Policy had some relevance to the strength of the Soviet Union at the time. The Soviet Union was a militarily powerful country, but its political and economic capabilities were not outstanding, and the long tug-of-war between the US and Soviets sparred not only on military power but also on the challenge of economic and other aspects of endurance. The Soviet Union responded more passively to the United States. After the signing of

the North Atlantic Treaty, the US-led capitalist bloc was established and the Soviet-led 7 countries with socialism established the Warsaw Pact in 1955 to counter NATO. Brandt's analysis, therefore, suggested that the Soviet's decision was motivated more by defensiveness than confidence. And as time progressed into the 1960s and 1970s, the Western-led peaceful evolution played a part. A growing national consciousness within several countries of the socialist camp has arisen. If Eastern Europe was allowed to develop its democracy, then the Soviet Union could have seen the collapse of the alliance between the USSR and the countries within its power. The Soviet Union, therefore, needed to strengthen its economic and political power by increasing its cooperation with the West, which was exactly what West Germany wanted. But at this stage, West Germany did not reveal its deep intentions. It was not until Gorbachev took office that West Germany showed its desire for a reunification of the two German states. So in order to promote the process of unification, it might be more time-saving if West Germany directly or indirectly expressed their hope to exchange the economic contacts with the Soviet Union for the return of East Germany's support in the course of the contacts with the Soviet Union.

The New Oriental Policy was implemented with great dependence on the two superpowers and therefore it had certain limitations. Whether the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union was good or bad constantly shaking the cornerstones of the policy. The United States wanted to have a force on the European continent that could effectively counterbalance the Soviet Union, hence it created NATO. Then West Germany's involvement with the Soviet Union would have made the US concerned about Germany's position, in that the New Oriental Policy did not give a definition of where a merged Germany would go, nor did it give a clear direction. This was not expressed until Kohl took office and stated in the Ten Point Plan that a merged Germany would remain in NATO. The United States is very concerned with weighing up interests in its involvement in international politics, and if a German merger could serve to contain the Soviet Union and even expand NATO's sphere of influence further east, then surely West Germany could gain more support from the United States.

6.2 Increase the cohesion of the German nation

As mentioned above, in the course of the engagement between East and West Germany, the Foundation Treaty was concluded, whereby West Germany relinquished full German representation and recognized the international legitimacy of East Germany. This created a practical divergence from the roof theory held by Brandt. The subsequent accession of the two Germanies to the United Nations as sovereign states within the meaning of the UN Charter contributed to a sense of "exclusivity" and exacerbated the contradiction between theory and reality. This situation also had an impact on the consciousness of the population, so how could the cohesion of the German nation be enhanced in the face of division? The New Oriental Policy focused on short-term international political status rather than national cohesion as a whole. It might be useful to refer to the strategy adopted by Kohl when he was subsequently in office, which was to develop ties with the GDR in all areas and not just in the economic sphere, the most effective of which was the policy of tourism and family visits on both sides. The fact that the division has been long-standing will lead to an intergenerational fading of national consciousness and the pursuit of independence rather than unity will become the dominant consciousness of the new generation of East and West Germans.

6.3 Concretizing the policy of German unification

The implementation of the New Oriental Policy was characterized by small steps, and Brandt's policy of "transformation through mutual acceptance" failed to specify what official policy would lead to the final form of unification of the two Germanies but remained a rather abstract concept of unification. For example, the desire for a better standard of living in West Germany would be enhanced by humanitarian aid for refugees from East Germany. Another example is that if the question of German reunification is to be set within the framework of European integration, then a concrete plan for the next steps in the construction of the European Community should be given to

the member states for discussion. This is the same strategy Kohl adopted when the ten-point plan was proposed, namely a combination of shelving major issues and releasing a tough stance to stakeholders, allowing West Germany to be guided by a more concrete policy for the reunification of the two Germanies. There would be no duality or incompleteness in the implementation of the New Oriental Policy.

7. Conclusions

An analysis of the background to the formulation of the New Oriental Policy during the Brandt period, the results achieved, the problems and the measures taken to solve them shows that the policy was adopted to the international political and economic situation of the period, contained many proactive elements, and also obtained positive effects, promoted exchanges and contacts between East and West Germany, and provided an experience for an independent and autonomous solution to the German problem. However, it had certain limitations and incomplete advancement due to the fact that it was still heavily dependent on the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

Does the successful reunification of the two Germanies have any value for other problems in the world arising from the bipolar pattern? After the victory in the Second World War, the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, fought fiercely in many parts of the world to gain more of the fruits of victory, for example, by dividing the north and south of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel, in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union respectively, and by supporting the establishment of the Republic of Korea by Syngman Rhee in the south of Korea in August 1948 and the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by Kim Il Sung in the north of the Korean peninsula in September 1948. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The inter-Korean question has a great deal in common with the German question in that both were artificially divided into two countries by the East and West camps due to ideological issues, and this situation has persisted for a long time an inter-Korean question has not been solved very well to date. The German question was resolved in a three-step process of peaceful and gradual reunification, with the West German side first strengthening the country economically, then exchanging economic power for international political status under Brandt through the New East policy, and then under Kohl through the Ten Point Plan and the 4+2 negotiating framework for the final reunification of the two German states. Under Kohl, the "10-point plan" and the 4+2 negotiations led to the unification of the two German states. In the process of resolving the inter-Korean issue, is it also possible to unify the weaker side through the stronger one? On the other hand, the reunification of the two Germanies was negotiated in a bipolar context, but in the case of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was it a simple trilateral consultation between the two Koreas and the US? This deserves more thought and analysis.

References:

- [1] Kloepper, Michael. Verfassungsrecht. Beck, 2010.
- [2] United States Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States, The Conference at Cairo and Teheran.1943.
- [3] W.R. Smyser, From Yalta to Berlin: The Cold War Struggle over Germany, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999
- [4] Loth Gut jahr, Germany and Defence Policy after Unification, Pinder Pulisherers, London & New York,1994
- [5] Friedrich August von der Heydte,“Deutschlands Rechtslage “, Die Friedens Warte , 1950/51(4) s.323—336, hier S. 333ff.

- [6] Jack S. Levy, "What Do Great Powers Balance Against?" in T.V. Paul et al., eds., *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (California: Stanford University Press)
- [7] Gottfried Niedhart, "Ostpolitik: Phases, Short-Term Objectives, and Grand Design". *GHI Bulletin Supplement* 1, 2003
- [8] Hans Nawiasky, *Die Grundgedanken des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1950, S. 7f.; Hans Kelsen, "The Legal Status of Germany according to the Declaration of Berlin", *AJIL*, 1945(3)
- [9] Frank Mayer, *Kennedy and Adenauer*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995
- [10] Manfred Uschner, *Die Ostpolitik der SPD*, Berlin: Dietz, 1991
- [11] Rudolf Bernhardt/Norbert Achterberg, "Deutschland nach 30 Jahren Grundgesetz", *VVDStRL*, 1980(1)
- [12] Juliane Spitta, *Gemeinschaft jenseits von Identität?*, Bielefeld: Transcript, 2012