

The Impact of Land Property Rights on China's Rural-urban Migration

Ze Yu

New York University, New York, United States of America

Zy2007@nyu.edu

Abstract. Due to the historical background of China, the land system in China possesses urban-rural dual characteristics and different land property right compared to other countries. This uniqueness matched China's land allocation but still evolve throughout the development of the country. In this paper, we will discuss the impact of land property right on China's rural-urban migration through the government's angle and the market's angle with the help of a database from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) national statistical survey. Further analysis on future policies will also be provided.

Keywords: land system, urban-rural migration, land property right, hukou System, China.

1. Introduction

1.1 China's Land System

China's land system plays an irreplaceable role in the ongoing process of transition that transforms China from an agriculture-based country into an urban one. Divisions of land institutions in China are obvious within different sectors, tightly connected with migration and future development. People's Republic of China (PRC) first established the household registration system(*Hukou*) to replace the private landlord ownership system in 1951. 1956 the land was collectively owned with even distribution to rural families. It is the same period when People's Commune impacted land property rights during the cultural revolution and township afterward. Household Responsibility System(HRS) was officially established in 1982, giving peasants more return on their production using the land. These new criteria contribute more rights than before and provide more opportunities to people such as leasing and migration.

1.1.1 Rural Land System.

Rural or suburban land covers the largest share of the total land and ensures agricultural performance. Rural land in China transforms from private ownership into state-led collective rural landownership(Fei&Liu, 2007), experiencing the transition from a rural to an industrial economy after the Communist Party of China came to power. In other words, the state undoubtedly possesses full control both politically and economically over rural areas. Peasant's rights to revenue and investment were truncated under the ownership of the state. Soon with the recognition of the inefficiency of state-controlled collective rural land ownership, innovation in the land system appeared in 1978(Liu,2018). 'Collective members' could benefit from the revenue of their agricultural products under the household responsibility system(HRS). As its name implies, household profits more bearing larger responsibility in production, which boosts economic development(Yang,1997). Farmers are contracted with the country and are able to receive the surplus in return. This policy gives individuals' rights back to some extent and further encourages production incentives resulting in an increase in production efficiency.

1.1.2 Urban Land System.

Compared to rural or suburban land, the urban land system guaranteed less limited access to land. Urban land rights include paid transfer and administrative allocation (Liu,2018), which result in generating a market of land use rights exchange.

1.2 Migration

Migration in China can mainly be categorized into 4 types: ‘rural-to-rural’; ‘rural-to-urban’; ‘urban-to-rural’; and ‘urban-to-urban’. Among the four types of migration, ‘rural-to-urban’ migration plays a major role in recent decades. T.P.Schultz analyzed individual migration from the perspective of human capital investment, arguing that individuals expect the migration to bring greater benefits to them, and migration itself is a kind of investment whose benefits can be obtained after a period of time, and migration occurs only when the benefits are greater than the costs. The motives of migration moving from rural districts to urban districts are often considered as push and pull factors, whereas the rural labor surplus is often viewed as the major push factor(Zhao, 2004).

As mentioned in China’s land system, the creation of HRS strengthens production efficiency and leads to excess labor in rural districts. The growing production efficiency led to a sufficient food supply in the market, resulting in the end of the food rationing system. Due to the above factors, migration becomes possible. Meanwhile, one of the worth noticing fact is that the urban-rural wage gap is quite significant. Urban residents’ wage is approximately 2.5 times as compared of rural residents , which provides a solid explanation of why the future migration wave extends.

1.2.1 Impact of Migration.

China is currently in the process of rapid urbanization and is eager to possess expansion in different industries and businesses, especially in urban areas. In urban areas, companies with the expansion of the non-state sector and relaxation of urban employment administration, demand for migrants also increases(Feng&Heerink). Peasants are able to accept new job opportunities with higher wages as mentioned. Accepting Migrants generally reduces the wage gap and certainly accelerates the development of the city(Peter,2005). The benefits of migration do not limit to higher wage expectations but also include better education systems, health systems, job opportunities, and the difference in land property rights, etc.

Migration is a double-edged sword. On the other hand, internal migration leads to job competition and can further result in unemployment. While there are residence permits and institutional barriers in urban areas, migrants are unlikely to become permanent residents in cities(Zhao 1999a & 1999b), which leads to a number of social issues such as traffic congestion, lack of labor protection, etc.

1.2.2 Hukou’s Impact on Migration

As mentioned, *Hukou* system originated in 1951 while its initial focal point was not on controlling migration. Two common explanations stand for the creation of the registration system. First is that after the Great Leap Forward and the famine, PRC starts to reinforce the regulations on the *Hukou* system, strictly controlling the population mobility including rural-urban migration. For such government behavior, one possible argument is the shortage of agricultural products, in other words, foods. Another argument is that peasants are the precious assisting resources in strategies that prioritize industrialization. Peasants need to stay in rural land to provide low-cost agricultural products to industrial departments. In that case, migration would be restricted no matter the sufficiency of food. *Hukou* and the people’s commune system largely increase the cost of migration for peasants. Under the people’s commune system, peasants’ revenue comes from their daily participation in group production. In other words, the opportunity cost of migration becomes high as a member of the commune. Meanwhile, the state allocates residency, job opportunities, food, and other necessities only through the *Hukou* system. Under such a policy, individuals won’t be able to survive in the local city without a *Hukou* registration. These policies are effective and successfully keep the migration rate at 0.24% from 1949 to 1985, whereas the world average migration rate is at 1.84% from 1950 to 1990(Zhao,2000).The *Hukou* system inevitably slows down the process of urbanization. Therefore, PRC’s adjustment to the *Hukou* system did not stop from 1978 till the recent era. To Zhao’s research (2004), PRC began to allow peasants to migrate to the urban area on the basis of their own subsistence in 1984. While after 1995, unemployment dramatically increases, and the local government has to control migration to resolve the situation. Apparently, PRC will not erase the

Hukou System. Instead, the reform of the system will be unlikely to stop and adjust for the control of migration depending on the current situation. Provinces like Jilin, Hunan, Guangdong, Liaoning, etc. have already abolished the different treatment between rural and urban registration since 2001. The purpose of this reform is to gradually enact such policies throughout the country with no doubt.

2. Literature

2.1 Property Right

China's land property rights exist in a dualistic system: in urban areas, individuals possess the full property rights of state-owned land, and the restricted land property rights of rural collectively-owned land in rural or suburban areas. ownership rights, usufructuary rights, and security rights are three types of property rights in China. According to the Property Rights Law, the land-use right is a "usufructuary right" that allows the right-holder, the usufructuary, to legally possess, utilize, or profit from property owned by another. (Property Rights Law, art. 117.) The fact of state-owned land originated from the land system mentioned previously, while the generation process is indeed reasonable from the fact that China has a large rural population that needs rural areas as the natural resources to develop.

2.2 The Mechanism of land property right impacting migration

Land property rights, along with the land system, have been continuously adjusted throughout the developing phase in China. The Rural Land Contracting Law of 2002 expands peasant's rights including but not limited to circulation, lease, contribution, mortgage, and transferring. The core of the policy is that household contract management becomes the basis and the land system is now a two-tier management system combining unification and division (Peter, 2005). As mentioned, the renewed system provides peasants incentives to produce more. This leads to production growth and the sufficiency of food for peasants' families. Peasants are able to transfer their land in the meantime, which further encourages the general migration move. Combining this surplus condition with the new contracting law as the preface, peasants have enough reasons to migrate to urban areas, thriving for a better living. HRS undeniably contributes to the development of rural land and free peasants to some extent, but the disadvantages appear under the trend of migration. The collectively-owned system provides each legal member the right to equally possess the land, and the result is that land allocation rearranges as the population alters (De & Yuan & Wang, 2021). Land property rights are adjusted irregularly. Thus, secure and stable land property rights cannot be guaranteed. From 1979 to 2006, China's urbanization rate increased from 18.96% to 43.9%. However, this official data on the urbanization rate does not only include the urban legal residents but also a considerable number of land-lost peasants in suburbs because of land expropriation. This problem becomes more and more serious along with the acceleration of industrialization and urbanization. Rural land rights are not guaranteed social security as urban land rights. This social phenomenon was viewed as reasonable for a long time as the only acceptable reason was that peasants already have the land use right that governments give. Therefore, the land itself provides guarantees for peasants. However, with the increasing income level of peasants, the effect of land use rights has become 'invisible'. There is an inevitable conflict between rural land rights and economic efficiency. The reform of rural land rights is continuous and continuing. One thing that can be guaranteed is the renewed policy counts toward the growth of urbanization while requiring labor. According to the relationship between urban scale benefits and costs obtained by the econometric analysis of almost 700 cities in China conducted by the Beijing Institute of National Economy, the urban population size between 100,000 and 10 million people has a positive net benefit, especially when the population size is between 1 million and 4 million people. According to official statistics in February 2006, there were only 10 cities in China with a registered population of more than 4 million, and only Shanghai and Beijing had more than 10 million. Government is surely open to accepting migration while keeping social risks at the lowest. One thing that can be predictable is both the acceptance of migration and the growth of urbanization

are the ultimate goals of China as a developing nation. Thus, the impact of land property right varies between positive and negative standards according to the renewal in policies(Knight&Song&Jia,1999).

3. Empirical Analysis

3.1 Data

This research makes use of widely used data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) national statistical survey. 450 village-level units and 17,000 people in 10,000 are covered in the data. The participants of the questionnaire are mostly at the age of 40 or beyond. Participants will be followed up for renewing every two years and all data will be updated one year after the end of data collection. Below is the notation for upcoming estimation and a brief description of each variable.

Table1. Descriptive statistics of regression variables

Variable	Description	Mean	S.D.	Observation
age	Age	58.833	10.919	20623
appropriation	Being Appropriated. 1=Yes;0=No	0.134	0.341	10826
edu	0=middle school or lower;1=college or lower; 2=graduate or beyond	1.575	0.837	20484
gender	1=male;0=female	0.474	0.499	20653
han	1=han nationality;0=other	0.923	0.266	18519
health	Self-assessed health condition. 1=healthy;0=otherwise	3.024	0.978	9286
hukou	hukou status. 1=agricultural;2=non-agricultural;3=unified;4=none	1.247	0.459	18551
marital	Marital Status. 1=Married with Souse present; 2=Married but not living with spouse; 3=Separated; 4=divorced; 5=Widowed; 6=Never married;7=cohabitated	1.579	1.349	18585
migration	Explanatory Variable. Have ever lived outside permanent residency for 6 months. 1=Yes;0=No	0.577	0.494	7165
parents	Is your father living? 1=Yes; 2=No	1.861	0.345	10712
party	1=Communist;0=other	0.108	0.31	18556
private_busi	Household involved in private business. 1=Yes;2=No	1.908	0.289	6402
rent_per	Percentage of rented land in total allocated land.	0.097	0.275	6402

3.2 Identification Strategy

3.2.1 Key Variables

Migration is the obvious variable that needs to be considered in the first place. This dependent variable is defined by CHARLS' questionnaire which states the respondent on whether they have ever lived outside permanent residency for 6 months, which could be considered as a fair approximation with minor errors.

To obtain the estimated effect of different factors on migration, especially on a land property right, extracting useful information from the questionnaire is necessary. Lease and appropriation are two angles in this estimation. To gather unbiased data and estimates, the policies must be unified throughout different districts therefore the rent percentage is used to replace the general leasing rights. Other variables such as age, health, and parents are also included in the regression to reduce omitted

variable bias, and the variables themselves certainly play key roles in decision-making in migration. It is worth noticing that variables can act differently in different regressions and can possess offsetting impacts as well.

3.2.2 Regression estimate

The initial thought on the statistical estimate of migration is a probit model due to the characteristic of migration itself. In the collected data, migration is considered a dummy variable and defined as the absent residency for 6 months as mentioned. In other words, the binary characteristic fits perfectly in a probit model. Considering the model include other variables such as income and age, etc. Linear regression model would inevitably lead to a probability that falls outside of the range between 0 and 1. The outcome of probit model should follow a normal distribution and result with an expected probability that is reasonable. The general form of probit model is presented below:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \beta_4 X_4 + \beta_5 X_5 + \dots + \beta_n X_n + \mu$$

In the regression, Y represents migration which is the key explanatory variable. The binary output of 1 and 0 stands for whether the migration occurs for the respondents. X1 stands for the crucial independent factor in the regression which is, as mentioned, rent percentage and appropriation. These two factors cut through market mechanisms and government mechanisms. The regressions mainly focus on discovering the significance of the two variables.

3.3 Market Mechanism

3.3.1 Basic Regression

To obtain the impact of the market mechanism of land property right on migration, we use the rent_per variable to address the influence. Rent_per, which is defined as the percentage of rented land in the total allocated land, needs to be ensured with other control variables. To ensure the reliability and unbiasedness of the estimate, we include health status, gender, income, and education level as other control variables in our regression.

From Table 2, the rent_per variable shows a significant positive correlation with migration. The further interpretation could conclude as the rental rights ensured would result in a higher probability of migration in China. Meanwhile, gender, log income, age, and party are also found significant in the regression analysis. A possible explanation could be found for the first 4 variables while the significance of the party variable is unexpected and further discussable.

Table 2. Probit estimates of migration(Market Mechanism)

Variables	Migration
Rent_per	0.658*** (2.134)
gender	0.971*** (4.96)
logincome	0.201** (2.42)
age	0.064*** (-5.45)
edu	-0.207 (-1.36)
health	-0.027 (-0.70)
party	0.743*** (2.49)

Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.3.2 Robustness Check

Robustness checking is necessary for empirical research. In this regression, adding/removing variables would be the general procedure to ensure the validity of the current result. The new regression model introduced new variables such as marital status and parental status. To further achieve the goal, the following tables applied two strategies. The first altering is the limitation of data points on possessing an agricultural hukou, which means that data-wise, hukou is equal to 1. Meanwhile, the new regression also sets an upper bound at the age of 80, considering the reasonable speculation of migrating under certain ages. The second strategy is generally adding each category of control variables. The fixed individual estimate would certainly reduce the cluster effect. For the second model, individual prov, education, and age were added. For the third model, marital status was added. While for the fourth and fifth models, the regressions were separately introduced with the status of the private business and the current parent's status.

From Table 3, the significance of rent_per undoubtedly decreased with certain adding/removing of the control variable which is acceptable. The general correlation between rent_per and migration are still positive in general while including individual data variable increases the impact of rent_per significantly.

Table 3. Probit estimates of migration(Market Mechanism) altered

	(1) model1	(2) model2	(3) model3	(4) model4	(5) model5
migration					
rent_per	0.376* (1.673)	0.623** (2.145)	0.637** (2.161)	0.652** (2.208)	0.634** (2.146)
logincome	0.088* (1.953)	0.136** (2.545)	0.140*** (2.615)	0.144*** (2.658)	0.139*** (2.599)
gender	1.124*** (8.456)	1.508*** (9.054)	1.498*** (8.825)	1.505*** (8.870)	1.498*** (8.818)
age	-0.038*** (-4.794)				
prov	-0.004 (-0.485)				
edu	-0.173* (-1.723)				
health	0.027 (0.401)	0.030 (0.366)	0.015 (0.183)	0.021 (0.247)	0.014 (0.172)
i.prov		0.461 (1.301)	0.466 (1.339)	0.472 (1.363)	0.465 (1.338)
party		-0.981*** (-3.825)	-0.999*** (-3.995)	-1.006*** (-4.000)	-1.002*** (-3.985)
han		-0.297 (-1.020)	-0.254 (-0.868)	-0.246 (-0.840)	-0.256 (-0.877)
i.edu		-0.089 (-0.508)	-0.053 (-0.301)	-0.042 (-0.241)	-0.053 (-0.301)
i. marital			-0.042 (-0.186)	-0.047 (-0.206)	-0.045 (-0.197)

i.age		-0.001 (-0.001)	0.013 (0.017)	0.009 (0.011)	0.018 (0.023)
_cons	1.241* (1.915)	-1.115 (-1.223)	-1.148 (-1.238)	-1.588 (-1.408)	-1.204 (-1.220)
N	489	478	474	474	474

Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.4 Government Mechanism

3.4.1 Basic Regression

Similarly, to obtain the impact of the government mechanism of land property right on migration, we use the appropriation variable to address the influence. To ensure the reliability and unbiasedness of the estimate, we include party status, gender, income, and education level as other control variables in our regression.

From Table 4, the appropriation variable shows a significant negative correlation with migration as expected. Reduced security of land property users possesses a belief in high opportunity cost and risk in migration which reduces the probability. Meanwhile, it is also worth noticing that the major ethnic groups han possess a positive correlation with migration. One possible explanation is the large population base of the han group influences the general result as it possesses an enormous percentage compared to minorities.

Table 4. Probit estimates of migration(Government Mechanism)

Variables	Migration
appropriation	-0.298** (-2.80)
gender	1.053*** (13.54)
logincome	0.041* (1.52)
age	-0.0304** (-7.78)
edu	-0.054 (-0.91)
han	0.3035** (2.43)
party	-0.753*** (-6.25)

Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

3.4.2 Robustness Check

Similar to market mechanisms analysis, robustness checking is necessary. The general strategies are the same. Removing/adding variables helps to ensure validity and observe the difference in correlation estimates. In robustness checking for government mechanisms, similar 5 models are applied. The main difference from the previous robustness checking is the key variable is now appropriation. The regression is still applied with the ownership of agricultural hukou and the age upper bound of 80. The following model possesses the same adding/removing strategy as the previous robustness checking.

Table 5 presents the result from model 1 to model 5. Appropriation presents a significant negative correlation with migration. The result is highly coincident with the basic regression result. Meanwhile,

appropriation's coefficient did not vary to a large extent compared to rent_per in the market mechanism estimate. The assumption is that appropriation held a rather constant negative impact on migration regarding the change of other factors. The significance of the appropriation coefficient undoubtedly decreased similarly. To conclude, appropriation is negatively correlated with migration significantly under the robustness checking.

Table 5. Probit estimates of migration(Government Mechanism) altered

	(1) model1	(2) model2	(3) model3	(4) model4	(5) model5
migration					
appropriation	-0.274** (-2.549)	-0.269** (-2.350)	-0.267** (-2.313)	-0.283* (-1.903)	-0.301** (-2.063)
log_income	0.045 (1.570)	0.062** (2.021)	0.060* (1.953)	0.075* (1.951)	0.069* (1.831)
prov	-0.003 (-0.663)				
age	-0.039*** (-8.076)				
edu	-0.050 (-0.801)				
gender	1.139*** (13.139)	1.170*** (12.562)	1.172*** (12.337)	1.051*** (8.705)	1.003*** (8.631)
han	0.303** (2.477)	0.265 (1.600)	0.267 (1.634)	0.156 (0.762)	0.142 (0.704)
party	-0.830*** (-6.091)	-0.816*** (-5.730)	-0.812*** (-5.733)	-0.898*** (-5.319)	-0.847*** (-5.130)
i.prov		0.252 (1.264)	0.262 (1.324)	0.386 (1.576)	0.286 (1.207)
i.age		-0.246 (-0.473)	-0.253 (-0.480)	-0.682 (-1.212)	-0.196 (-0.339)
i.edu		-0.054 (-0.532)	-0.023 (-0.225)	-0.021 (-0.160)	-0.014 (-0.111)
i.marital			0.255* (1.735)	0.198 (1.201)	0.181 (1.110)
parents					0.044 (0.302)
_cons	1.457*** (3.680)	-1.784*** (-3.346)	-1.847*** (-3.400)	-1.452** (-2.067)	-1.591** (-2.415)
N	1281	1271	1271	852	868

Robust z-statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4. Analysis

4.1 Market prospect

The general correlation between rent percentage and migration is predictable. The general motive for migration was initiated mostly because of discontent in the economic aspect, in other words, the market aspect. Peasants are not satisfied with their current status in between the land and land and could not provide their families sufficient profits to make a better living. Migration itself can be considered an investment. Civilians with agricultural hukou generally experience the transformation from agricultural life to industrial life, which is extremely selective under the huge population base of China despite the difficulty of urban residency and the opportunity cost of rural land use. Leasing right is one of the closest forms of ownership while the guarantee of leasing inevitably bonded with the increasing motives of migration. Therefore, the significance of the positive correlation is not surprising. The variation in the variance of rent percentage is unexpected. The general interpretation could be the addition of individual variables to some extent increase the variance inflation factor of rent percentage. Still, the market prospect of land property right possesses profound meaning. Leasing right guaranteed the flow of residency between rural-urban areas. Once the liquidity is guaranteed, innovation and growth will soon follow.

4.2 Appropriation prospect

Appropriation and migration inevitably share a negative correlation. Appropriation of land is a signal of insecurity and will be eternally planted in people's minds. The policy drastically increases people's fear of bearing the cost. In the probit estimate, the appropriation variable held a rather constant and negative correlation with migration. The result can be stated as a solid and accurate measurement of land insecurity's impact on migration. This insecurity undoubtedly becomes a barrier to migration between urban and rural districts. The lack of land security is a complex conflict in China's land system. Within the interest of the country, appropriation allows reallocate and rural land operating efficiency while maintaining the stability of agricultural labor. Meanwhile, appropriation reduces the liquidity of labor to some extent and slows down the urbanization process.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we focus on analyzing the impact of land property right on rural-urban migration in China. Based on data from China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study, we conduct two basic regressions through market and government prospect and multiple robustness check trials to test the validity. The regression estimate indicates that land leasing right has a positive correlation with migration and land right insecurity possesses an opposite negative correlation with migration. In the meantime, income and party identity both play significant roles in migration. People's demand for migration increases matched with the higher profit in urban districts. The male variable also shows a higher positive correlation with migration as the general culture encourages the male to seek job opportunities and the female to fulfill the house duty. Age variable presents that the elder is unlikely to migrate compared to middle-aged respondents. Commune Party were also less likely to migrate as well.

China's Land property rights system adjusted and altered according to its culture and history. The natural focus is on the collectively-owned property and the barrier impeded on the peasants. Generally, there are three strategies for adjusting landownership in China, nationalization of agricultural land, privatization of agricultural land, and improvement of collective ownership. Privatization supporters emphasize that individual ownership strengthens legal and political protection. On the other hand, economists who support the nationalization of agricultural land criticize current collective ownership. Tianyong Zhou(2004) comments that the incomplete property on collective ownership leads to reduced efficiency and he suggests the adjustment into state ownership. Modern property economists believe that private property rights systems are efficient. The property rights arrangement, however,

under the framework of our country's basic social and economic system, the privatization of agricultural land is facing strong ideological resistance. While nationalization is the right transfer under the collective ownership transformation and obviously has lower resistance, the strategy of right exchange on land will be problematic. Whether using trade or appropriation will possess huge trading cost and public opinion. According to the previous analysis, the practical way of China's land system would be the continuous adjustment of the current collective ownership. The ultimate goal of rural land rights will be the detailed rights and regulations guaranteed by laws and to turn vague images of collective ownership into a clear image of each individual right under the regulations.

References

- [1] Zhao, Yaohui (1999a) "Leaving the Countryside: Rural-to-Urban Migration Decision in China" American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 1999, 89(2): 281-286.
- [2] Zhao, Yaohui (1999b) "Labor Migration and Earnings Differences: the Case of Rural China" Economic Development and Cultural Change 47(4): 767-782.
- [3] Zhao Jianying, Li Na, Peng Wenzhuo(2018). "After 80 million people enter the city." Workers' Daily
- [4] Au. C.C., J.V. Henderson(2002), "How Migration Restrictions Limits Agglomeration and Productivity in China", NBER Working Paper.
- [5] Tianyong Zhou(2004). "China's land strategy under urban acceleration." China Land
- [6] Wang, Qianxi, and Xiaoling Zhang(2017). "Three rights separation: China's proposed rural land rights re-form and four types of local trials." Land Use Policy. 63. Elsevier,
- [7] T.Paul.Schultz(1978). "Determinants of migration" Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- [8] Ho, Peter(2005). Institutions in transition: land ownership, property rights, and social conflict in China. Oxford University Press.
- [9] Tong, De, Yuxi Yuan, and Xiaoguang Wang(2021). "The coupled relationships between land development and land ownership at China's urban fringe: A structural equation modeling approach." Land Use Policy.
- [10] Yang, T. D. (1997). China's land arrangements and rural labor mobility. China Economic Review, 8(2), 101-115.
- [11] Feng, and Nico Heerink(2008). "Are farm households' land renting and migration decisions inter-related in rural China?." NJAS-Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences 55.4
- [12] Knight, John; Song Lina and Jia Huaibin (1999) "Chinese Rural Migrants in Enterprises: Three Perspectives" Journal of Development Studies 35: 73-104.