

Study on the Influence of Social and Economic Factors on Fertility Willingness of Urban Residents:--Empirical analysis based on the data of China Comprehensive Social Survey (CGSS2018)

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Abstract: With China entering an aging, fewer children and unmarried society, the problem of low fertility has attracted more and more attention, and fertility willingness has become one of the key points in the study of a fertility rate. This study uses the data of China Comprehensive Social Survey (CGSS2018) to analyze the influence of socioeconomic factors on urban residents' fertility willingness. The empirical results show that: (1) The larger the existing family housing area, the higher the fertility willingness. (2) The higher the education level, the lower the fertility willingness. (3) The higher the income, the lower the fertility willingness. (4) Compared with individual socioeconomic indicators, the influence of spouse's education level and income on fertility willingness is more significant. After dealing with endogenous problems through a robustness test, the research conclusion is still robust. The purpose of this study is to further reveal the socioeconomic factors affecting fertility willingness and provide reference for the formulation of fertility-related policies.

Keywords: socioeconomic; indicators; fertility willingness; gender equality.

1. Introduction

China's total fertility rate has been declining since the beginning of the family planning policy in 1978. In 2015, the 'comprehensive two-child' policy was implemented. In 2016, the total fertility rate briefly surged to 1.7, which increased compared with 2015, but began to decline again in 2017 and dropped to about 1.5 in 2018. At the same time, China's aging rate is on an unprecedented scale. According to the latest research data, the natural population growth rate in China in 2022 is -0.6%, starting negative growth China will be in the old-age population structure for a long time, and the aging of the population is an irreversible normal phenomenon and basic national condition in China at present and in the future. It is estimated that around 2030, at the age of 65, more than 20% of the elderly in the world have entered a super-aging society.

The acceleration of the three major trends of aging, fewer children and unmarried makes it urgent to encourage fertility. The birth policy is inseparable from the national conditions. China's birth policy was put forward as early as ten years ago. In 2013, the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Comprehensively Deepening the Reform of Several Major Issues" proposed that "a single party can be guided families who are only children have another child". In 2015, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18 the CPC Central Committee decided to "through strengthen adhering to the basic state policy of family planning, we should improve The Strategy of Population Development and fully implement that a couple can have two children policies". In 2021, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee reviewed the "Optimizing Birth Policy to Promote Long-term Balanced Population Development" The decision and put forward the policy that "A couple can have three children".

However, from partial liberalization to comprehensive three-child policy, the total fertility rate has not increased significantly. Fertility desire As an important index to predict a fertility rate, it is influenced by many factors, from fertility willingness to fertility behavior The realization of the system is restricted by many factors⁴. In order to explore the objective factors affecting the a fertility rate transformation in China, this paper. With the help of socioeconomic indicators, this paper studies the socioeconomic factors affecting fertility willingness.

2. Literature review

2.1 Studies on Factors Affecting a fertility rate Abroad

There is ample evidence that a fertility rates have fallen below a replacement level (about 2.1 children per woman) in many developed countries over the past few decades. According to the second demographic transition theory, values and changes in attitudes (such as personalization and secularism), are caused by low a fertility rates and low a fertility rates in European and other Western societies which are the main driving force of related family changes.

Becker once pointed out from the perspective of microeconomics that there is not much difference between having children and buying durable consumer goods for families. Children need their parents' time and input the goods they buy. Under the mediation of income effect, the income elasticity of child service is the sum of the income elasticity of child quantity and the income elasticity of child quality. Under the mediation of price effect, under the given condition of consumer preference, the decrease of price equals the increase of real income, because more children's services and other goods can be purchased, so the family can get more utility. The other is to keep the utility unchanged. Even if the price drops, families will not increase the number of children they buy, but will choose the quality of children.

Likewise, in his book *Economic Backwardness and Population Growth*, Leibenstein mentions that the utility of children includes: Consumption utility, economic utility, economic risk utility, old-age security utility, maintenance of family status utility, and contribution to family expansion and development utility. The cost of raising children includes direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs refer to all kinds of maintenance expenses, education expenses, medical expenses and other expenses spent by parents from the time of pregnancy to the time when children live on their own feet. Indirect cost is the opportunity of education or income that parents give up in order to raise their children. The research on fertility cost-utility in China began in 1980s. In 1990's, combined with China's reality, this paper discussed the related theory of fertility cost-utility, and reached the conclusion at present. It is the continuous rise of fertility cost that has obvious inhibitory effect on fertility decision-making, and even some scholars believe that in the progress. After entering the stage of low a fertility rate, China's fertility decision-making has changed into a cost-constrained model.

Some scholars have emphasized the importance of economic factors in understanding low a fertility rate. With women's educational level and the increase of labor force participation rate, the opportunity cost of childbearing is also increasing. This means that if they want to have a baby, as a child, you need to give up your job for a long time and face the risk of being replaced by others.

According to this theory, generally speaking, the higher the socioeconomic status of women, such as receiving higher education,

Having higher income is negatively correlated with a a fertility rate. Not only that, but highly educated groups (especially women), pay more and more attention to matching and identifying with the values of the other half, thus making couples double in results. Families with higher education have more similar and equal gender concepts.

Economic explanations for low a fertility rates are becoming more and more important in East Asian countries, and increasing economic inequalities and employment insecurity creates a sense of instability and fear, leading to greater investment by young people in education and careers. Therefore, especially those young people with limited career prospects may postpone or even give up starting a family. Perceptions of economic insecurity, coupled with rising housing prices and rising child-rearing costs, may be important factors contributing to China's persistently low a fertility rate.

2.2 Domestic Research on Factors Affecting a fertility rate

Besides economic factors, it is also worth noting the unique social and cultural background. In China, women's reproductive behavior is largely influenced by their ability to balance work and child-rearing responsibilities. Gender equality theory. It is assumed that between individual-oriented institutions (such as education and the labor market) and family-oriented institutions, conflict on gender equality leads to a decline in a fertility rate. This hypothesis helps explain China's low a

fertility rate. Because the tension between women's educational and career opportunities and persistent gender and family norms may force many women to postpone or give up childbearing, there is still the idea of "men dominate the outside and women dominate the inside" in Chinese traditional culture, which emphasizes women's role in family life and includes special expectations of gender for women.

At present, the existing influencing factors of fertility willingness in China mostly focus on social economy, population characteristics and micro factors such as related policies. It includes but is not limited to: family capital, housing price, cultural value, education level... Moreover, the Chinese family fertility model has the characteristics of intergenerational transmission, and the fertility behavior of the father has the same effect on the offspring. The more the number of siblings in the family of origin, the more the fertility willingness and behavior of the offspring, the higher the reproductive behavior.

It can be seen that economic factors play an important role in understanding the changes of a fertility rate. Related to it, socioeconomic status (SES) is defined by scholars as an overall measure of a person's work experience and the economic and social status of an individual or family relative to others based on factors such as income, education and occupation. The three constituent indicators of socioeconomic status (SES) are education, income and occupation.

After the social and economic status was widely recognized by the West, its value has been widely recognized in various disciplines and fields until now. At the same time, this index is also accepted across races and regions all over the world, including China. Therefore, this study wants to use this index to analyze the fertility willingness in China, as a supplement to the research on the objective factors affecting fertility willingness in China.

Among all kinds of research on fertility willingness in China, there are few mature research works on influential comprehensive indicators (such as socioeconomic status). Among the few existing research results, some researchers have only made partial analysis on a certain kind of indicators of socioeconomic status, which can not fully show the whole picture of comprehensive indicators of socioeconomic status.

3. Data introduction and variable setting

3.1 Data Sources

This study uses the data of China Comprehensive Social Survey (CGSS) conducted by China Survey and Data Center of Renmin University of China in 28 provinces and cities in China in 2018, and the specific model fitting is analyzed by Stata17.0.

There are 12,787 samples of CGSS data in 2018. Before Poisson regression analysis, the data has been cleaned up according to the research needs. First, due to the huge differences in fertility concepts between rural and urban areas in China, and the economic development and cultural development are still in an unequal state, the research object is limited to urban residents, so the samples of agricultural registered permanent residence are screened out first. In addition, in the dependent variable "fertility willingness", missing values and invalid answers are eliminated. After screening these two key indicators, the final effective sample size is 10,346, and the effective sample rate is 80.91%.

3.2 Setting variables

3.2.1 Dependent variable

The dependent variable of this study is the fertility willingness of urban residents, and the problem of "the number of children you want to have if there is no restriction form policy" is used as the measurement index of this variable. Because the number of samples whose variable value is greater than 5 is small, it is not suitable to include them in the model analysis alone. Therefore, the samples whose dependent variable value is greater than 5 are combined into the value of 5, and the common value is 5, which also means that more children are expected to be born. The value of dependent variable in the sample is between 0 and 5, because the value of this variable can only be separated

from the positive value of scattered type is in a certain interval, and it has obvious counting characteristics, so it determines the model fitting method is more suitable for Poisson model.

Table 1 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables

Number of children expected to have	Frequency	Percentage
0	302	2.75
1	1831	16.69
2	6344	57.83
3	1270	11.00
4	519	4.73
5	248	2.26
Total	10451	100
Mean value	Standard deviation	Maximum value
2.053	0.903	5
		minimum value
		0

3.2.2 Independent variable

The independent variable of this study is "socioeconomic factors". In this paper, the socioeconomic status index (SEI) is expanded and similar variables are replaced, including: personal education level (divided into primary school and below, junior high school, high school, university and above), spouse education level (divided into primary school and below, junior high school, high school and above), personal total income in 2017, spouse's total income in 2017, family housing area,

In the preset experiment, the variables related to occupation, such as "freedom of work", "occupation type" and "nature of work unit", are included in the study. Because there is a certain causal relationship between variables such as occupation and variables such as housing area and income, it is found that there is collinearity among variables after being gradually included, which affects the experimental results, the related variables of occupation are eliminated in the study, and the conclusions are derived from income and housing area.

At the same time, the basic variables are included in the benchmark model: gender, age, nationality (divided into Han nationality and ethnic minority), religious belief (divided into religious belief and non-religious belief), marital status (divided into spouse and no spouse), political outlook (divided into Communist Party /democratic parties and the masses).

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of research variables

Category variable	Frequency	Percentage
sex (N=10970)	male	5097
	Female	5873
Ethnic Group(N=10970)	Han nationality	9584
	Ethnic minorities	10144
Religious belief(N=10970)	Do not believe in religion	9780
	Believe in religion	1190
Marital status(N=10970)	Have a spouse	8317
	No spouse	2653
My education level (N=10944)	Primary school and below	4347
	Junior high school	2884
	High school	1927
	University and above	1786
Education level of spouse (N=8460)	Primary school and below	3268
	Junior high school	2499
	High school	1509
Political outlook (N=10956)	Communist Party member/citizen Main party	1230
	Masses	9726
Continuous variable	Mean value	Standard deviation
Age	53.278	16.635
My total income in 2017	8.246	3.825
Total income of spouse in 2017	8.115	3.998
Housing area	4.563	0.607
Own property	0.707	0.619
	Maximum value	Minimum value
	118	18
	16.113	0
	16.118	0
	7.601	1.945
	6	0
		Sample size
		10970
		10430
		7877
		10579
		10690

(Note: Among the continuous variables, my total income in 2017, my spouse's total income in 2017 and housing area are logarithmic in order to increase accuracy.)

4. Empirical analysis results

4.1 Descriptive Results Analysis

It can be seen from Table 1 that only 2.75% are unwilling to have a child without policy restrictions, which shows that residents' willingness to have children is still relatively strong. However, more than 50% of the residents are willing to have two children. Combined with the data of wanting to have one child, we can conclude that although there is no restriction form policy, most residents are still only willing to have one or two children, which is the same as the plan from the early days of the founding of New China to before family planning. Compared with the fertility willingness in the early stage of fertility implementation, it has dropped a lot, posing a strong contrast.




Fig. 1 Fertility willingness and actual number of births in different birth cohorts

It can be seen from Table 2 that among the samples of classified variables, Han nationality (92.63%) accounts for the majority, non-religious (89.15%) accounts for the majority, spouses (75.82%) account for the majority, and the masses (88.66%) account for the majority. The proportion of people who have received higher education (university or above) in their own education level and their spouses' education level is less.

In the sample of continuous variables, the age is about 53.27, indicating that most of them are middle-aged and elderly people. On average, each person owns 0.7 suites, less than 1 suite, which shows that under the current circumstances, the housing problem still exists, and there are still residents who do not have their own houses. My total income in 2017 is basically equal to the average income of my spouse in 2017, which shows that when choosing a partner or spouse, most of them still choose the object whose income matches their own, and there is no obvious difference.

4.2 Regression analysis

If events occur independently and have a constant probability, the count of events over a period of time follows

Poisson distribution is the limit distribution of binomial distribution when there are many events. Namely:

$$b(k; n, p) \rightarrow \frac{\lambda^k e^{-\lambda}}{k!}$$

It is assumed that the distribution probability of k events observed in a certain period of time (Δt) (that is, the probability that random variable X takes k value) can be expressed as:

$$P(Y_i = k_i | X_i) = \frac{e^{-\lambda_i} \lambda_i^{k_i}}{k_i!} (k_i = 1, 2, 3, \dots)$$

Lambda in the above distribution is the mathematical expectation μ , and the fitted logarithmic linear model is called Poisson model. In this study, the dependent variable is "the number of children you want to have without policy restrictions". Due to children quantity can only be a discrete variable, and the number of children that individuals can have due to physiological restrictions is limited. According to the data description results, the mean value of the whole data is 2.053, the variance is 0.903, and the variance is less than the mean value, so this study is suitable for Poisson model analysis.

Table 3 Poisson model of the influence of social and economic factors on fertility willingness of urban residents

Independent variable	Benchmark model	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Gender (female)	0.010 (0.014)	0.003 (0.017)	0.009 (0.019)	0.014 (0.019)
Age	0.008*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Political identity (Communist Party member/Democratic Party)	0.062** (0.022)	0.002 (0.027)	-0.015 (0.028)	-0.015 (0.028)
Ethnic group (Han nationality)	0.069** (0.026)	0.040 (0.030)	0.051 (0.031)	0.045 (0.033)
Religious belief (no belief)	0.065** (0.022)	0.059* (0.025)	0.061* (0.026)	0.061* (0.027)
Marital status (with spouse)	-0.009 (0.016)	-0.019 (0.051)	-0.016 (0.055)	-0.009 (0.057)
My education				
Junior high school		-0.065** (0.021)	-0.050* (0.022)	-0.047* (0.022)
High school		-0.104*** (0.026)	-0.082** (0.028)	-0.076** (0.028)
University and above		-0.090* (0.037)	-0.054 (0.039)	-0.049 (0.040)
Education of spouses				
Junior high school		-0.101*** (0.021)	-0.091*** (0.022)	-0.089*** (0.023)
High school		-0.108** (0.026)	-0.091** (0.028)	-0.080** (0.028)
University and above		-0.128*** (0.036)	-0.095* (0.038)	-0.087* (0.039)
My annual income in 2017				
			-0.008** (0.002)	-0.007** (0.002)
Spouse's annual income in 2017				
			-0.009*** (0.002)	-0.009*** (0.002)
Number of properties owned				
				0.011 (0.014)
Housing area (existing)				
				0.049*** (0.014)
pseudo R ²	0.014	0.012	0.013	0.013
LRchi2 (15)	416.463	288.499	289.619	279.668
Sample size	10440	8136	7466	7141

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. The brackets in independent variables are reference items, and the brackets in the model are robust standard errors.

As shown in Table 3, in the benchmark model, age, political identity, nationality and religious belief all have significant influence. Among them, for every one-year increase in age, the expected number of births of urban residents increases by 1.008 (e 0.008) times. The expected number of births of the masses is 1.063 (e 0.062) times that of the Communist Party members/democratic parties.

The expected number of births of ethnic minorities is 1.071 (e 0.069) times that of Han nationality, which may be related to the state's separate birth policy for ethnic minorities. The Sixth Five-Year Plan approved by the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in 1982 pointed out: "In areas where ethnic minorities live in compact communities, family planning should also be implemented, and family planning work plans should be formulated according to the economic, natural conditions and population conditions of each region." This shows that the fertility wishes of ethnic minority residents are hardly affected by policy restrictions.

The expected number of births with religious belief is 1.067 ($e^{0.065}$) times that without religious belief, which can be interpreted as that the fertility willingness may be related to some cultures in religion. For example, Muslims have the idea that "whoever has mastered fertility will master the world", which will affect the fertility willingness of urban residents to a certain extent.

Among them, the results of gender and marital status are not significant, which can be interpreted as the difference between male and female fertility willingness is not significant, and whether there is a spouse has no significant influence on fertility willingness.

In the first model, two variables, namely, my education and my spouse's education, are newly included. The original significant variables-political identity, ethnic groups become insignificant, age and religious beliefs are still significant, but the significance of religious beliefs is reduced.

The effects of the two new variables are very significant, and there is a negative correlation between education level and fertility willingness. Compared with urban residents with the highest educational background of "primary school and below", the number of expected children with the highest educational background of "junior high school" decreased by about 7% ($1 - e^{(-0.065)}$), the number of expected children with the highest educational background of "high school" decreased by about 10% ($1 - e^{(-0.104)}$), and the number of expected children with the highest educational background of "university and above" decreased by about 9% ($1 - e^{(-0.09)}$). The influence of spouse education is more significant, and it is significant at the level of 0.01 in each value of the variable.

In the second model, two variables, my total income in 2017 and my spouse's total income in 2017, are newly included. In the benchmark model, only two variables, age and religious belief, still play a significant role. In Model 1, the value of "junior high school" and "senior high school" in my own education situation is still significant, but the significance decreases, while the value of groups with college education or above becomes insignificant, indicating that there is no significant difference in fertility willingness among groups with college/university/graduate education or above, and the significance of different values of spouses' education situation also decreases.

The newly included two variables play a very significant role, and there is a negative correlation between income and fertility willingness. For every additional standard unit of an individual's total annual income in 2017, the number of children expected to have will decrease by about 0.7% ($1 - e^{(-0.008)}$). The impact of spouses' total income for the whole year of 2017 is even more significant. For every increase in income, the number of children expected to be born will decrease by about 0.8% ($1 - e^{(-0.009)}$).

In the third model, two variables, the number of owned houses and the area of existing houses, are newly included. In the benchmark model, only two variables, age and religious belief, play a significant role. In the first model, the new variables related to education play a significant role, and the significance remains unchanged, but the value of some coefficients decreases, and the value of some variables is no longer significant. In the second model, the new income variables play a significant role, and the significance remains unchanged, while the values of some coefficients decrease.

Among the newly included two variables, the variable result of the number of real estate is not significant, and the impact of (living) housing area on fertility willingness is significant, and the housing area is positively correlated with fertility willingness. For every standard unit increase in housing area, the number of children expected to be born will increase by about 5% ($e^{0.049} - 1$). This can be extended to explain that owning several suites or whether the property right of the house is their own will not affect the fertility willingness of urban residents. They may choose to rent a house for a long time or live together in their parents' house, but the housing area is very important for urban residents.

4.3 Robustness Test

In order to verify the robustness of the model, the ordered logit (ologit) model is used to fit the data.

In the ologit model, according to the initial Poisson model, the benchmark model and three test models are constructed respectively, in which the benchmark model still includes the same demographic basic variables as Poisson model, such as gender, age, nationality, religious belief, etc. In the three test models, just like Poisson model, three new variables, namely, personal education level and spouse education level, personal total income in 2017 and spouse total income in 2017, family housing area and the number of houses owned, are included successively.

The following table shows the comparative validation results of the benchmark model and the third test model in Poisson test and ordered logit test.

Table 4 Comparison of some results between Poisson model and Ologit model

Variable	Poisson benchmark model	Ologit reference type	Poisson Model 3	Ologit Model 3
Age	0.008***	0.037***	0.005***	0.024***
Political identity	0.062**	0.297***	-0.015	-0.086
Ethnic group	0.069**	0.342**	0.045	0.235*
Religious belief	0.065**	0.335***	0.061*	0.315***
personal education				
Junior high school			-0.047*	-0.288***
High school			-0.076**	-0.433***
University and above			-0.049	-0.287*
Education of spouses				
Junior high school			-0.089***	-0.454***
High school			-0.080**	-0.457***
University and above			-0.087*	-0.468***
Spouse's annual income in 2017			-0.007**	-0.041***
Spouse's annual income in 2017			-0.009***	-0.046***
Housing area			0.049***	0.338***

As shown in the above table, some variables that have no significant influence in Poisson model are significant in Ologit model, such as when the variables of "nationality" and "my education" in the third model are university or above. The values of significant variables in Poisson model are still significant in Ologit model, and the significance of most variables increases, such as religious belief, personal/spouse education level, and my total income in 2017... However, the coefficients of corresponding independent variables in Poisson model are smaller than those in Ologit model. From the results of R 2, the fitting results of Poisson model are more robust than those of Ologit model.

Generally speaking, the results of Poisson model are still valid in the ordered Logit (Ologit) model, and the results of regression analysis have been verified.

5. Discussion

Based on the data of China Comprehensive Social Survey (CGSS) in 2018, this paper analyzes the influence of the education level, income level, number of houses owned and housing area on urban residents' fertility willingness, and further explores the mutual influence among variables. The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows:

First, there is a negative correlation between education level and fertility willingness of urban residents. The higher the education level, the less willing to have children. Moreover, the influence of spouse's education level on fertility willingness is more significant.

Second, there is a negative correlation between income level and fertility willingness of urban residents. The higher the income level, the less willing to live. Similarly, the income level of spouses has a more significant impact on fertility willingness.

The higher the education level, the more likely it is to get higher income and higher social status. With the expansion of universities, recruitment, serious depreciation of academic qualifications,

increased social involution, unsatisfactory job market, it is very difficult to obtain higher social and economic status, the opportunity to choose whether to give birth is getting higher and higher, and the environment is very unfriendly to women's employment and promotion path. Some women who have finished giving birth will face separation from work when they return to the workplace. Section or the risk of being replaced, the difficulty of continuing employment is relatively high.

Nowadays, the cost of childcare is getting higher and higher, and it is difficult for ordinary families to bear such pressure. Although raising children will bring them great benefits in the future, they do not expect too much compensation for this delay, and are more willing to use the wealth brought by their social and economic status to satisfy their own lives, and pay more attention to what they can get now.

At the same time, from the results, the influence of spouse variables is more significant. This shows that the family in China is not only economic unit of production and reproduction, but also an order unit, an education unit and a welfare unit, and bears the responsibility of socialization and protection of its members. Marx's family view holds that the essence of family is a special social relationship, and marriage and family are based on economic conditions. Social division of labor in the family is very important. Nowadays, most people prefer to share responsibilities between husband and wife, so the socioeconomic status of the other spouse is even more important.

Third, the number of housing ownership has no significant impact on the fertility willingness of urban residents, but the housing area is positively correlated with the fertility willingness of urban residents. Whether the property right of the house is their own or owning several properties will not affect the fertility willingness of urban residents. Facing the various and highly developed housing market, they can have more choices. However, the housing area is very important for urban residents, and the space of family activities affects the quality of life after giving birth. Therefore, in order to improve fertility willingness, the study puts forward the following policy-related suggestions:

First of all, attention should be paid to the challenges faced by individuals with different socioeconomic status. In fact, the groups with low socioeconomic status have strong fertility willingness, but they are limited by their mastery of various capital levels. Policies should pay more attention to groups with low socioeconomic status and understand their needs.

Secondly, for people with high socioeconomic status, such as women who want to continue working after giving birth. According to this, we can put forward policies to reduce the burden of balancing work and childcare, such as: encouraging enterprises to carry out tax subsidies and adding facilities that are convenient for childcare. Expand parental leave, ensure stable employment and encourage couples to have children.

Furthermore, in addition to these policies, direct economic benefits are also provided, such as cash allowance at birth for the second and third children, so as to appropriately reduce the cost of children's medical care or education and enhance their fertility willingness.

6. Research limitations and prospects

6.1 Prospects

The popular social and economic indicators in the West are used to measure the fertility willingness in China, and the causal relationship between several variables is detected, which makes up for the deficiency of some studies.

6.2 Research limitations

First of all, this study focuses on the differences between urban and rural areas, lacking the division of regions. According to the statistical data, economic level of different regions in China varies greatly every year, so this study may not be applicable to the fertility wishes of urban residents in every region.

Secondly, the relationship between fertility willingness and fertility behavior needs more in-depth study. There is no age limit in this study, and there is no complete match between fertility willingness

and fertility behavior. For people of non-childbearing age, they may no longer want to give birth, or their fertility willingness will change when they reach childbearing age.

Finally, although this study found that spouse variables have a more significant influence on dependent variables, in a family, whether male variables have a stronger influence or female variables have a stronger influence is worth exploring and measuring.

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