The Relationship between Executive Internal Compensation Gap and R and D in IT Industry
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.6981/FEM.202408_5(8).0011Keywords:
Internal Executive Pay Gap; R&D Investment; Managerial Power; Tournament Theory.Abstract
Taking listed companies in the information technology industry as the research object, this paper discusses the impact of the salary gap among senior officials on R&D investment, and takes the managerial power as a moderating variable to study its impact on the relationship between R&D investment and senior officials. salary gap among senior officials on R&D investment, and takes the managerial power as a moderating variable to study its impact on the relationship between the two. It is found that the compensation tournament has a significant incentive effect in information technology industry, and the internal executive compensation gap has a positive relationship with the internal compensation of senior officials. It is found that the compensation tournament has a significant incentive effect in information technology industry, and the internal executive compensation gap has a positive relationship with R&D investment, and will be affected by managerial power. According to the strength of managerial power, further analysis shows that the proportion of managerial ownership has a restraining effect on the relationship between the two, while the decentralized compensation gap has a positive relationship with R&D investment, and will be affected by managerial power. After grouping the samples according to the strength of managerial power, further analysis shows that the proportion of managerial ownership has a restraining effect on the relationship between the two, while the decentralization of ownership and the integration of two jobs have a positive effect on the relationship. paper provides empirical evidence for compensation system design and R&D decision-making of listed companies in information technology industry.
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