

The necessity for recognition and its political-theoretical conception

--An analysis of recognition theory based on Taylor, Honneth

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Abstract

The need to obtain recognition from others is eternal for people in social relationships. The highly developed economy and material culture of modern society have brought about the hidden worries of modernity, where material abundance contrasts sharply with spiritual deprivation, and the lack of a sense of significance and a sense of belonging brings spiritual pain to modern people. As a result, the root causes of social conflicts have gradually turned to social values and cultural contradictions. Today, with the increasing trend of cultural pluralism, the importance of recognition is constantly highlighted. Recognition partly constitutes identity, and when a person does not receive recognition from others or only receives distorted recognition, his or her own identity will be in trouble. The acquisition of recognition, whether through dialogue or struggle, is a process of self-realization. The acquisition of recognition is important because it means more than anything else the acquisition of equal rights, respect, security and freedom, and the establishment of a further sense of self. So how to obtain recognition, modern political theorists Taylor and Honneth, on the basis of absorbing the essence of theories of their predecessors, combined with the needs of real politics to put forward their own unique political concepts, in the "politics of recognition" and "the struggle for recognition" the two thinkers were respectively in "the politics of recognition" and "the struggle for recognition", the two thinkers explained the necessity of recognition and different ways to obtain recognition. By analyzing the theories of recognition of these two thinkers, we can gain a deeper understanding of the root causes of cultural conflicts and the politics of recognition.

Keywords

Recognition theory, Taylor, Honneth.

1. Introduction

The idea of "recognition" has a long history and people seem to seek some kind of recognition, whether individually or communally, in the private or public sphere, so why is there a need to seek recognition? Why is it necessary to seek recognition, and what theoretical conceptions of the acquisition of recognition do political theories offer? From the Christian idea of equal recognition to Rousseau and Kant, and from Hegel to Fichte and Marx, many thinkers have made theoretical or practical explorations based on the social reality in which they live. Since the 20th century, globalization has been developing at a high speed, and the development of science and technology and communication has made the movement of people and the exchange of information more frequent, and the social economy has been developing continuously, and the material abundance has contrasted with the spiritual emptiness and scarcity, and the hidden worry of modernity has been highlighted continuously, and the confusion of the value standard, the slippery slope of the moral norms, and the extreme individualism have brought about the

meaning of life's emptiness and pain. Social conflicts are not only limited to the material and economic level, but more acute differences in values such as gender, ethnicity and culture lead to further intensification of conflicts, and the issue of recognition once again enters people's vision and receives attention. Taylor and Honneth absorbed the theoretical essence of Hegel and other thinkers, and put forward their own modern recognition ideas around the recognition issue, and this paper analyzes the theoretical conception of the two in order to explore its positive significance.

2. Literature review

The emergence of the idea of recognition can be traced as far back as Christian thought, which asserts that all are equal before God, and that God's acceptance of the equality of secular human beings reflects mankind's quest for recognition, and is the goblet of the idea of equal recognition. Thereafter, the Italian statesman Machiavelli, after experiencing the complex political struggles in Florence, proposed a social state of struggle, arguing that the sphere of social action is under a state of eternal struggle between subjects for the protection of the flesh. Hobbes inherited and developed this idea, arguing that there is a constant desire and effort to pursue a happy life, but as soon as one person encounters another, the expected behavior expands into an act of power, which serves as a defense, seeking to constantly expand one's power to defend oneself against possible crises. This is the mode of thought of the continuous struggle for survival that influenced Hegel's later thinking on the question of recognition of acquisition. Meanwhile Hobbes introduced the concept of recognition in the ninth of the fifteen natural laws listed in *Leviathan*, "Every man ought to recognize that others are born equal to himself, and that he who violates this maxim is proud"⁰. In the Enlightenment period, people looked to the establishment of contracts as an alternative to struggle to achieve self-sustainability, in which people who were originally at war with each other coexisted peacefully by recognizing each other's defined rights, personhood, and security. The necessity of recognition emerges as equality, respect and security are gained through mutual recognition. Fichte regards recognition as an indispensable link in the deduction of the concept of juridical power, "If a juridical relation should arise from my knowledge of the other, then this knowledge and the limitations that arise from it must be mutual. It follows that all juridical relations between particular people are conditioned by their mutual recognition and are exclusively prescribed by that recognition. Recognition is the result of interaction between the individuals who determine the juridical relations, with the intersubjects requiring each other to act freely, and in turn limiting their own behavior to what is beneficial to the other, forming a consensus for obtaining objective validity in the juridical relations"^[2].

Hegel puts forward "recognition" through self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the dialectical trinity, "self-consciousness of itself" is the first stage, through which self-consciousness is unified with desire by constantly abandoning and reverting to itself, but it can only become true self-consciousness under the condition of recognizing the other's self and object. However, only under the condition of mutual recognition of each other's selves and objects can human desires be satisfied and become true self-consciousness. According to the dependence of self-consciousness, Hegel proposed the "master-slave dialectic"^[3]. Hegel proposed the "master-slave dialectic". The master-slave relationship is dialectical, transformable, and exists for the purpose of realizing the recognition of the self-consciousness of the self, and finally, in the process of movement, mutual recognition of each other's consciousness leads to the possibility of equal dialogue. The confrontation between masters and slaves for recognition eventually develops a relationship of mutual and equal recognition. Hegel reveals the significance of recognition for human development and the historical inevitability of human society to finally realize equal recognition, while the struggle between

subjects for mutual recognition generates a kind of internal pressure in society, and also helps to establish a practical political system that guarantees freedom^[4]. The struggle for mutual recognition between subjects creates an internal social pressure and contributes to the establishment of a practical political system that guarantees freedom. George H. Mead divided the self into two levels, the "subject self" and the "object self," with the subject self being the unconstrained self and the object self reflecting the image of the self in the eyes of the other. The degree to which the subject ego is recognized helps it to develop its own sense of individual specificity so that it can perform its function in the social division of labor. A person recognizes that the contribution created by his production can be respected in the social division of labor. When the Master Self's special way of self-realization is recognized by the community as a positive contribution to the community as a whole, the Master Self's self-consciousness further establishes itself as a unique and irreplaceable individual^[5]. Marx's idea of recognition is characterized by labor, which helps people to realize and recognize the essence of the self, the individual realizes his social nature in the process of labor, and the mutual recognition of subjects is an interactive social relation, while the labor-production activity is the process of recognition^[6]. The activity of labor production is the process of recognition. Marx explains the new master-slave relationship in the capitalist commodity economy society, unlike the Hegelian subject recognizes another independent self-consciousness or the consciousness of the non-independent failed slave, and the consciousness of the object. Instead of mutual recognition between subjects with independent or non-independent personalities, one recognizes the other as a crop. In this new relation of recognition, the one regarded as a crop is regarded as an instrument or a means, and this is true of all people, who are means to obtain the recognition of others through their deception^[7]. The only way to obtain recognition from others is by means of labor and other means to the community or the community. It is only by contributing to the community or to the individual through work and other means to gain recognition from others that one can recognize and realize one's essence as a human being. Raymond Aron argues that the notion of recognition is inherent in the proletarian revolution, "The notion of the proletarian revolution itself contains the notion of a 'universal class' or 'authentic interactive subjectivity', as well as the notion of a homogeneous society," he argues. concept, as well as the notion of a homogeneous society, i.e., the mutual recognition of human beings, the disappearance of the antagonism between masters and slaves"^[8]. In his 1967 evaluation of Hegel's dialectic of ethical relations, Habermas argues that self-consciousness is the result of the struggle for recognition, that it is only possible on the basis of mutual recognition between subjects, and that identity must be based on mutual recognition between subjects, and that it is only possible through self-recognition and identification with the other who recognizes me^[9]. The identification is only possible through self-recognition and recognition of the other in me. Both identity and self-consciousness can only be formed on the basis of mutual recognition. Francis Fukuyama inherited Huntington's logical line of thought and regarded the search for "recognition" as the root of human politics from the perspective of political development and the clash of civilizations, and the process of zero-sum game of "struggle for recognition" produced political order^[10].^[11] The process of the zero-sum game of "struggle for recognition" gives rise to political order. In the context of modern Western liberal democracy, a specific form of political system, he argues that this political system grants equal rights to all people, has "recognized" all people equally, and has fulfilled the nature and desires of human beings as recognizing animals^[11]. "Recognition" has three interpretations in French semantics, an attitude of approval towards something, a feeling of gratitude for some kind gesture made by someone, and recognition on a legal level. Starting from the semantics of recognition in French, Liko considers the theoretical literature on recognition as an event of thought, matches the semantics of recognition in the lexicographical sense with the regularity of the event of thought, and argues that in the stage of mutual recognition, in addition to the

social struggle triggered by negative emotions (e.g., anger), there is a place for responsibility between humiliation and anger, and that there is a combination of individuality and responsibility. and that responsibility, which is both individual and social, leads to mutual recognition of peace and gratitude^[12]. Recognition In addition to allowing people to realize their own essence and bringing identity, order and peace, the question of recognition is also considered a question of justice, a question of whether a society's value model and cultural order allow all people to participate fairly in the life of the society as equal human beings. Fraser argues that recognition is a matter of objective cultural order, and that the struggle for recognition should be a complement to redistribution, which in turn leads to a deepening and refinement of the idea of human emancipation and a critique of contemporary capitalist society^[13].

3. Taylor's "politics of recognition": the quest to reconcile two conflicting political models

Why do we need recognition? Taylor argues that recognition partly constitutes identity, and that when people do not receive recognition from others or receive only distorted recognition, they have problems with their own identity, are trapped in the distorted impressions of others for the purpose of self-degradation, and are indirectly portrayed as inferior, resulting in self-loathing and psychological trauma. The modern emphasis on recognition stems from two changes, one being the collapse of the hierarchical system that was the basis of honor, where not everyone was entitled to honor and precedence, and the shift to dignity for all, which is appropriate in a democratic society. The second was the eighteenth-century emphasis on individualized identity, which was accompanied by the ideal of authenticity^[14]. The second was the eighteenth-century emphasis on individualized identity, accompanied by the ideal of authenticity. The ideal of authenticity implies a moral intuition of right and wrong within the human being, a consciousness that arises in the process of shifting the moral center of gravity from external constraints to internal consciousness. Rousseau argued that our inner voice is often drowned out by lust, arrogance, and conceit, and that to be saved we need to escape from our desires and find our inner truth, emphasizing the importance of the "conscious self," or ego. After Rousseau, Herder further pondered that each person has a unique way of existence and its own "measure", and at the same time put forward his principle of originality at two levels: at the individual level, the individual is faithful to his own uniqueness and shapes himself; and at the national level, a nation should be faithful to its own culture. In current political practice, recognition goes hand in hand with the ideal of authenticity.

In the public sphere, the politics of equal recognition manifests itself in two modes: the politics of universalism and the politics of difference. The politics of universalism emphasizes the equalization of rights and entitlements for all. This is in contrast to traditional societies in which a small group of people enjoys honor and priority because of their social status, where all people enjoy equal dignity and there is a greater emphasis on uniformity of universal enjoyment. The politics of difference, by contrast, argues for the recognition of what is different about each person, the existence of a specificity that would stifle the ideal of authenticity if this uniqueness were obscured or assimilated by the dominant, majority identity. The politics of difference is decontextualized from the politics of universal dignity, and thus shares similarities with the politics of universalism in its quest for equality in condemning discrimination. While the politics of universal dignity also opposes discrimination, but in a way that ignores difference, the anti-discrimination of the politics of difference calls for differentiation on the basis of difference, arguing that a consistent approach would instead be an act of discrimination that fails to recognize uniqueness. Thus, a divide emerges, with advocates of universal dignity politics seeing such differentiation as a betrayal of universal principles. Both political models

under the politics of equal dignity are based on the foundation that all people deserve equal respect. The reason that all people deserve respect is that we live by the principle of reason. The two political models, although based on the same foundation, are in conflict with each other; they have the same claim to the need for recognition, but opposite definitions of what that recognition entails. The former political model, with its disregard for individual differences, has been criticized as "pseudo-value-neutral", appearing to be tolerant, but in fact displaying its cultural hegemony in a highly discriminatory manner, which is particularism in the mask of universalism. Taylor points out that the key to this most disturbing aspect of liberalism is the criticism of the very premise of all assumptions, questioning the validity of disregarding difference: whether disregarding difference is itself a reflection of some kind of particularism masquerading as universalism.

In real political practice, the politics of Taylor's recognition is also to respond to the challenge of the politics of cultural pluralism, and the issue of cultural recognition is also an issue that must be debated and resolved for the further development of democratic politics. Taylor analyzes the case of Quebec, Canada, which is constantly teetering on the brink of secession to explore how to bridge the conflict between consistency and specificity to satisfy the need for recognition. How to satisfy the need of francophone Quebecers to protect their national identity while ensuring the coherence of the broader national context, the province of Quebec legislates restrictions on its residents such as the requirement that only non-francophone residents can attend English-speaking schools, and that businesses with more than fifty employees must be French-speaking, restrictions that would not be permissible in the rest of Canada in contravention of the Charter. Publicly advocating for a collective goal is seen as limiting an individual's right to free choice, even if the accommodation is for the protection of national identity, which is unacceptable in the eyes of non-French people. This stems from Kant's philosophical idea that dignity comes from autonomy, and that free societies cannot openly support the notion of a so-called good life, and that a person's right to live as he or she chooses is prioritized over a collective goal. But Taylor argues that this notion does not fit the Quebec model, that the preservation of traditions is a good thing, that certain variations to preserve traditions do not imply harm to sacrosanct fundamental rights, and that exemptions in the case of good reason should be distinguished from fundamental rights. Liberalism disregarded differences or rather disregarded them, often demanding sacrifices of particularity and concessions to collective goals, making it difficult to accommodate particularity. Respecting diversity and the fundamental rights to be guaranteed to those who oppose it, society remains liberal. The quest for recognition is, in a way, about securing the rights to be enjoyed behind that recognition. One of the reasons for the rise of women's groups, minorities and nationalist movements in the last century is that the values of these groups are not recognized by the majority and often they have to accept being portrayed in a low and distorted light and losing their right to be respected. Changing this image and gaining equal recognition, rejecting the imposition of other cultures and rebelling against the perceived superiority of those cultures are the focus of these groups' struggles. Liberalism believes that multiculturalism can be made to coexist by "ignoring differences", based on the principle of value neutrality, but in fact this approach and principle do not provide a basis for interaction between diverse cultures. However, as societies become more and more pluralistic, and as population movements and cultural infiltration continue to take place, liberalism is faced with the challenge of how to treat citizens who belong to various subcultures in the same society, accommodating their particularities and aggregating and eliminating their sense of marginalization without altering the basic political principles.

Taylor's conception of recognition is divided into two dimensions, the private and the public spheres, with Taylor's emphasis in the private sphere on the individual's own recognition through dialogue with the Other. The essential feature of human life is not monologue but

dialogue. It is precisely because human beings have the ability to express themselves verbally that they can realize mutual understanding through dialogue; each person is an individual, and it is another rational individual who carries out the dialogue, and the Other is meaningful to the individual. We recognize as well as identify as being in constant dialogue with the meaningful Other. The effect of the other on the individual is continuous and long-lasting not depending on the existence or non-existence of a body in the physical sense. The individual dialogues with the other in order to realize himself and further construct his own identity, rather than being controlled by the other to construct identity through a relationship with the other. By establishing a relationship through dialogue with the other, one recognizes one's own preferences, expectations, and loves, and engages in sharing with the other to further approach what is cherished, constructing who I am and where I come from in the process. This is also similar to McIntyre's discussion of narrative unity in which history is the basis of narrative, and we cannot describe individual actors outside of their historical context because action cannot be separated from intention, which can only be located within the context; therefore, the individual in action is always historical, and it is only within the narrative of history that descriptions of behavior are intelligible^[15]. The individual is therefore always historical, and it is only within a historical narrative that the description of behavior becomes intelligible. Recognition and identification of the individual cannot be achieved in isolation from relations and contexts, but through a semi-public, semi-intimate dialogue. Dialogue does not have to take the form of language, or music, or poetry; the Other does not have to be an objective person, but can be God, the past, the future. Cultural pluralists, based on the assumption that we should respect all cultures equally, demand that university curricula add courses on women and non-European races and cultures, etc., because these people from excluded groups receive, directly or indirectly, images of inferiority shaped by the Other, and that the addition of courses helps them to understand and recognize the cultural context in which they live, which implies an acknowledgement of their culture. Taking their assumption to the extreme is that all cultures are of equal value, an assumption that Taylor partially affirms. He argues that the culture that feeds a society does have value, but that the various forms of culture and the stage in time in which they are found do not necessarily have equal value. In the public sphere, Taylor advocates a critical look at other cultures through a "convergence of horizons", emphasizing the openness of horizons and their relation to the historical situation. Cultures have their own horizons, and understanding and interpreting them also has its own horizons. Understanding other cultures does not mean abandoning one's own horizons, but rather juxtaposing one's own cultural background with that of the culture one is trying to understand, and expanding one's own horizons as one's understanding deepens and integrates with one's own horizons. Pluralists further demand not only that different cultures be treated with care through in-depth study, but also that they be judged for the values they create. Taylor states that there is a right to make judgments, but there is no right to demand that cultures be recognized as highly valuable when studied and understood in depth. A hasty evaluation based on personal preference or a condescending appreciation is not an objective and prudent acknowledgement, but rather a form of disdain that does not lead to tolerance and respect.

4. Honneth's "struggle for recognition": three modes and the motivation for the struggle

Hegel proposes three modes of recognition: love, juridical power, and solidarity, and Honneth argues that there is a need to reinterpret Hegel's trichotomy in terms of its theoretical connotations proposing: private relations with love and care (the principle of need) as the dominant concepts; juridical power relations regulated by equal rights and duties (the principle of equality); and social relations of respect with personal achievement (the principle of

contribution) as the normative criterion for social hierarchy^[16]. Honneth sees love as an ontological relationship in a neutral sense, encompassing not only emotional attachments between men and women in a gendered sense, but also patterns of strong emotional relationships between a few people such as parents, children, and friends. In love the subjects identify with each other the specific features of their needs and recognize each other as needy beings representing the first stage of mutual recognition. The human mother-child relationship has a special symbiotic stage, in which the interaction between mother and child is absolutely dependent at the beginning of life; the mother self-identifies with her baby during pregnancy, caring for the baby on the basis of instinctive emotions, while the baby is absolutely helpless and absolutely in need of the mother's security of growth and emotional comfort. The mother and child recognize each other's interdependence, and as the infant grows up and comes into contact with the outside of the mother, he or she becomes independent, realizing and recognizing that the mother is another entity with rights, and that the mother is gradually detached from the infant's dependence and becomes independent, completing the process of the transition to dependence. In this process, the mother accepts and recognizes the child's independence, the child realizes that she has lost her all-powerful control over her mother and displays aggressive struggles, the mother's love is long-lasting and all-embracing, and the baby grows into a child with psychological self-confidence, i.e., self-trust in being able to exist on its own, and the recognition of love enters into a more mature stage. Love is reciprocal in the relationship, and recognition is characterized by a dual process in which the other is freed and at the same time emotionally attached to the loving subject. The symbiotic bond highlighted through mutual longing in turn generates the basic individual self-confidence necessary for independent participation in public life. Love can be seen as an emotional experience of caring beyond distance, which becomes the psychological basis for the subject's trust in his or her sense of self-need and self-desire. In legal relations, it is precisely because of the mutual recognition between human subjects that they realize that they are not only bearers of rights, but also have normative obligations towards others. Legal relations are forms that can be understood as mutual recognition. In the state, a person is recognized as a rational individual who overcomes his or her self-conscious state of nature to submit to a higher universal will, and obtains recognition by submitting to the law, where the individual both recognizes the other as free and expects the other to recognize the individual as free. The gentler nature of legal recognition in traditional societies implies that the self and the other need to respect each other as subjects of law, and that they are both aware of the social norms for the proper distribution of rights and duties in the community. When an individual formally becomes a member of an organization or a community, he or she has a certain social role and is thus recognized and enjoys rights. Legal recognition is limited by social status and is graded according to the importance of the social role assumed by the subject.

In modern times, legal recognition has become stricter, and when legal norms recognize in principle that interactive partners are free and equal beings, subjects may be expected to develop the will to consciously obey the law. A stricter requirement of mutuality arises between subjects of law, who are expected to obey the law while recognizing each other as individuals capable of making reasonable moral judgments. At the same time, legal recognition requires universal respect for "individual freedom of will", which means "equality before the law", i.e. equality of legal personality. In the case of human beings, we have only the general characteristics of human beings, excluding our identity and accomplishments, and only as human beings to be recognized as such. And how is the individual constituted? The assumption that the ability to make reasonable moral judgments independently is a human being, excluding the status factor, is the very premise of the modern legal community. In modern times, the rights of legal persons who are recognized and respected by each other as persons with the ability to make judgments have changed, resulting in the creation of three categories: human

rights, political rights, and social rights. When the principle of equality was incorporated into legal relations, the number of subjects enjoying rights was expanded, and groups that had previously been excluded came within the scope of legal recognition, and legal relations were universalized, with rights being granted equally to all persons who were free to exist. For members of society, the possession of rights means being recognized by the laws of the society, and the enjoyment of legalized recognition leads to the emergence of self-esteem, which cannot be generated if rights have not been granted. The starting point of everything comes from legal recognition, and the suppression of the recognition of the inability to enjoy rights means the infringement of the individual's self-esteem. While legal recognition represents recognition as a universal characteristic of human beings, social recognition requires the reflection of intersubjective differences, and mutual recognition in society is expressed in the formation of a community of values in which the members of society have common value goals. Honneth analyzes the traditional nature of the social value model has two properties, internal symmetry "in the society of the subjects produced by the group, the group produced within the overall value of homogeneity, the subjects in the group can be in a unified standard of self-learning and learning from each other, can be in the group to show their own personalities and self-competence to the fullest extent, to a large extent, the individual within the group are all the same, the group is not the same, but it is the same. To a large extent, the individuals within the group are able to make mutual progress and common development" and external asymmetry "In the process of social development, the groups formed by individuals have different status in the society, and are divided into hierarchical classes through class differentiation"^[17]. The two characteristics brought about the creation of conflict on the one hand and the decline of the traditional concept of honor being replaced by status and prestige on the other. Into the modern era, honor is transformed into dignity, and at the private level into honesty, a new system of recognition and was introduced into the social importance, but still subordinate to the cultural conflict, the different groups in the conflict by means of symbolic power, to attract public attention to enhance the social value of the community to further enhance the social status of its members individuals in order to value the value of the community of the common value of the struggle, solidarity is understood as the subject of the mutual importance of the interaction between the different ways of life. The solidarity is also understood as the interaction of subjects who value each other's different ways of life. With the individualization of forms of recognition, individuals not only attribute value to the community to which they belong, but also attribute their achievements to their own recognition by other members, and gain "self-respect". Thus, in modern societies, one of the forms of recognition that is necessary for solidarity is individualization and reciprocal social relations between individuals.

Contempt is the negative equivalent of the recognition relationship, allowing social actors to recognize that they are being denied recognition of the Human beings constantly seek recognition based on the need to acquire rights, identity, self-esteem, etc., and being denied recognition by the Other means being scorned and hurt^[18]. Honneth proposes three forms of contempt that correspond to his three models of recognition. Contempt is the negative concept of recognition, and contempt harms intersubjective access to affirmative self-understanding. The first form of contempt is related to physical abuse, being forcibly deprived of the right to freely dispose of the body, manifested in the destruction of personal self-confidence, affecting the subject's ability to engage in normal interactions with others, this contempt deprives of this recognition of the human being's right to freely dispose of his or her body, which arises from his or her process of socialization with emotions. The second type of contempt is the exclusion of the subject from the enjoyment of rights by society, the failure to enjoy the status of an interactive partner with the most equal moral rights, the inability of the individual to be recognized as a subject capable of moral judgment, and the weakening of the subject's moral self-esteem. The third type of contempt corresponds to solidarity, depriving the subject of social

recognition in the form of self-realization that must arise from overcoming obstacles encouraged by group solidarity. The negative affective experience produced by the above three types of contempt is the very source of emotional motivation for the struggle for recognition. One is denied recognition, humiliated, and hurt, and the individual generates the emotional experience of self-shame, while the refusal of recognition by the Other subjects the subject to the oppression of a lowered self-appraisal. Accompanied by emotional agitation, the experience of being scorned becomes a motive for struggle.

5. Reflections on the recognition theories of both Taylor and Honneth

For people in social relations the need to obtain recognition from others is eternal. In *The Politics of Recognition*, Taylor analyzes the reasons for the importance of modern recognition discourse. He introduces the empirical into the concept of recognition, arguing that the construction of identity is all linked to the "politics of recognition", elaborating a politics of recognition that acquires identity through dialogue in the private sphere, and applies it to the public sphere as the politics of equal recognition, the principle of value neutrality is precisely adapted to cultural pluralism in the pattern of globalization. The principle of value neutrality adopted by the politics of equal recognition is aptly adapted to cultural pluralism in the context of globalization, whereby identity is extrapolated to recognition and cultures achieve co-prosperity through recognition, but because of this the empirical discourse suffers from metaphysical dilemmas. Taylor attempts to bridge the two conflicting political paradigms in search of a middle way, taking into account the legitimacy of the politics of equality and dignity while not ignoring the values and demands of the politics of difference. Although he proposes a way of treating different cultures in a "convergence of visions", he does not offer a more concrete middle way. In the reality of increasingly acute cultural conflicts, it is not clear whether the integration of horizons can really be achieved, nor is it possible to evaluate different cultures to the satisfaction of others after integration. Knowing and then understanding is already difficult, and integration of visions is an initiative, not an imposition, and it is too idealistic to gain recognition in this way. In addition, whether all cultures and claims should be recognized, there is no uniform standard for judging cultures, and different countries and regions of the world are not even at the same stage of development. If we look at the cultures of backward regions with more civilized cultural evaluation standards, we will find that some cultural practices and requirements are bad habits and oppressive to specific groups, but in their localities they are regarded as traditional cultures that should be respected. Should they be respected or further recognized in such cases? Taylor did not provide an answer in this regard.

In inheriting the essence of their predecessors' ideas and trying to respond to the needs of real problems, Honneth and Taylor are in agreement, both focusing on the minority of society to tolerate differences, trying to explore the meaning of life, looking for the significance of modern identity to repair the defects of liberal theory, and attempting to break the hidden worries of modernity. However, because Taylor was confronted with the hot political issue of the Quebec secession movement, the theoretical response was naturally more concerned with recognition in different cultural groups, and although Honneth extended the scope to group to group in the later stages of recognition thought, the overall theoretical conception focused more on the inter-subjective recognition of individuals. In addition, Honneth's difference lies in the fact that the theoretical sources are more inspired by Hegel's "pre-phenomenology of spirit" work, as well as Mead's social psychology, Foucault's analysis of rights, and Habermas's theory of interactional action, and that he constructs a model of mutual recognition based on a monistic conception of love, law, and solidarity between subjects from the perspectives of social ethics and political ethics. A model of mutual recognition based on a moral perspective^[19]. Honneth's

recognition theory emphasizes that the way to obtain recognition is to engage in inter-subjective struggle, explaining what recognition means, and proposing three modes of recognition from a combination of experience and norms, while at the same time corresponding to the development of three modes of contempt: rape, disenfranchisement, and humiliation, which Taylor does not have. At the same time, Honneth believes that the process of struggle and resistance after being scorned is also regarded as the process of self-recognition, and in a more macroscopic perspective, he believes that the process of social integration is also the struggle between social actors to obtain recognition^[19]. The process of social integration is also seen as a struggle for recognition among social actors. In contrast to Taylor's approach of negotiation and dialogue for recognition, Honneth inherited Hegel's idea of "struggle for recognition". In today's increasingly multicultural conflicts, Taylor's approach of obtaining recognition through dialogue and negotiation on an equal footing may be unattainable for disadvantaged minorities, and it is perhaps because of the lack of a more moderate way of expressing their demands that today's situation of intense conflict has evolved. Respect, recognition and further equality of rights and values can only be truly obtained and realized through struggle.

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