

Deep Integration of Digital Economy and Manufacturing Industry from the Perspective of Productivity Paradigm Transformation: A Systematic Literature Review

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Abstract

This review focuses on the transformative impact of the integration of digitalization and manufacturing on productivity paradigms. It systematically reviews relevant studies from leading international journals, summarizing existing achievements while identifying research gaps. The conceptual framework encompasses three key domains: the digital economy, industrial integration, and paradigm shifts, grounded in four theoretical foundations. Based on existing evidence, five core mechanisms are distilled: factor recombination, efficiency enhancement, innovation empowerment, value chain upgrading, and policy-driven dynamics. While there is clear academic consensus on the productivity effects, three critical research gaps remain to be addressed. Accordingly, this review proposes a research agenda specifically oriented toward filling these gaps.

Keywords

Digital Economy; Manufacturing Industry; Industry Convergence; Total Factor Productivity; Global Value Chains; Digital Transformation; Productivity Paradigm.

1. Introduction

Artificial intelligence, cloud platforms, big data analytics, and the Internet of Things are no longer mere buzzwords; they are actively reshaping how goods are produced, how value is created, and the competitive landscape across industries [1, 2]. The concept of the "techno-economic paradigm," proposed by Perez [3], offers a framework for interpreting this transformation. According to her, the current period involves a fundamental rewriting of production, consumption, and exchange. At the heart of this transition lies the deepening integration of digital capabilities with manufacturing.

Consider, for instance, the work of Acemoglu and Restrepo [4]. Their central insight is deceptively simple: automation does not just destroy jobs-it unleashes a cascade of displacement, productivity gains, and new task creation that fundamentally recomposes the structure of production factors. Brynjolfsson and Hitt [5] point out that the productivity payoff from computerization can be five times larger over a five-to-seven-year horizon than in any single year-mostly because firms need time to put complementary organizational changes in place. Taken together, these insights suggest that integrating digital technologies into manufacturing isn't just a simple technology swap. If anything, it calls for a systemic overhaul of production factors, operational routines, and how value is structured.

Using both country-level and firm-level data-most notably China's Annual Survey of Industrial Firms-a number of studies have shown, time and again, that when digital intensity rises it tends to be positively associated with total factor productivity [6,7,8], with innovation outcomes [9], and with a firm's participation in global value chains [11,12]. The available evidence indicates at least three mediating factors that help explain the relationship: one is the improvements observed in supply chain efficiency, another is the more effective allocation of skilled labor and a third is the gains made in organizational innovation capability [6,13].

For all its richness, the literature reviewed here still displays two blind spots that are particularly troubling. On the theoretical side, the connection between productivity paradigm transformation and industry convergence has yet to be established in a convincing manner, whereas the path that runs from macro-level technological revolutions to meso-level industrial restructuring is, to a large extent, still treated as something of a black box. On the empirical side, there is a gap that is just as important: the individual transmission channels have been examined rather thoroughly, yet far less is known about the way these mechanisms actually interact, or about whether they tend to amplify or to offset one another [18]. In an effort to close those gaps, this review brings together four theoretical frameworks, pulls the scattered evidence into a single five-mechanism model, and sketches out a research agenda for the work that lies ahead.

Section 2 first puts forward definitions of the core concepts—chiefly digitalization intensity and manufacturing upgrading—and Section 3 then lays down the theoretical foundations; after that, Section 4 goes on to review the empirical literature, while Section 5 brings in the five-mechanism framework. Section 6 offers a critical assessment, Section 7 sets out the directions for future research, and Section 8 finally brings the paper to a close.

2. Core Concept Definitions

2.1. Productivity Paradigm Transformation

Let's start with Perez [3], who made a convincing case that technological revolutions—those clusters of radical innovations, new infrastructure networks, and institutional adaptations—periodically reshape how economies are organized. Data has become a full-fledged production factor. Organizational forms are increasingly network-based. And cyber-physical production systems are blurring the traditional boundary between goods and services [14, 15]. Acemoglu and Restrepo [4] provide the microfoundations for this idea through their task-based model, in which automation displaces labor from some tasks while simultaneously generating demand for labor in entirely new activities. Nambisan et al. [10] extend the logic further, into the domain of innovation, arguing that digital technologies do not simply change production methods—they also reshape how new products, services, and business models are conceived from the outset.

2.2. Digital Economy

What do we mean by "digital economy"? For our purposes, it is a production system where data functions as a primary input, modern information networks form the backbone, and ICT adoption powers economic transactions. Goldfarb and Tucker [1] offer a neat shorthand: digital technologies compress five cost categories—search, replication, transport, tracking, and verification. Brynjolfsson and Hitt [5] make a useful point: digitization's productivity returns really depend on organizational co-investment—flatter hierarchies, retrained workers, redesigned decision processes. Rochet and Tirole [22] go a step further. They draw attention to the market-structure angle: multi-sided platforms, powered by network effects and algorithmic matching, are tearing down conventional industry boundaries and creating new organizational forms.

2.3. Deep Integration of Digital Economy and Manufacturing

The term refers to a systemic process by which digital technologies and data are brought into, and become integrated throughout, every stage of manufacturing—covering initial research, product design, production, logistics, after-sales service, and customer engagement. This kind of convergence marks a substantial departure from the technological upgrading seen in the Fordist mass-production paradigm, and Frank et al. [16], together with a number of other scholars, have argued that it redefines value creation at a fundamental level and redraws sector boundaries.

One strand, illustrated by the work of Frank et al. [16], examines the way in which servitization and Industry 4.0 technologies come together to produce new business models; the other, captured in the studies of Zhong et al. [14], points to the specific technological foundations—namely cyber-physical systems, IoT infrastructure, and cloud platforms—that render large-scale convergence feasible in actual practice. To my mind, the more useful of the two is Zhong et al.'s [14]: knowing which technological foundations make convergence buildable today is concretely actionable, whereas the servitization-business-model literature often describes end states that few factories have actually reached.

3. Theoretical Foundations

3.1. Industry Convergence Theory

Industry convergence theory has a fairly straightforward answer: technological change and regulatory shifts. First, there's the technological side—sensing, processing, and connecting capabilities get built into physical production systems, and that fundamentally changes what manufacturing firms actually do. Second, there's the market side. As manufacturers digitize, they start offering hybrid product-service bundles, which puts them head-to-head with pure software and service providers [16]. This way of thinking helps explain why traditional industry classifications—built on the assumption that sector boundaries are stable—really struggle to capture the blurry reality of digital-manufacturing integration.

3.2. Techno-Economic Paradigm Theory

Perez [3] accounts for techno-economic paradigm shifts by pointing to three interconnected forces: the coming-into-being of pervasive generic technologies, the building-out of new infrastructural networks, and the realignment that takes place within institutional frameworks. Artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things make up the technology cluster, cloud computing together with 5G networks supply the infrastructure backbone, and the reforms now under way in data governance and industrial policy stand as the institutional response.

Acemoglu and Restrepo have taken this framework further along two lines; on the theoretical side, they put forward a dynamic growth model that captures the race between automation and new task creation [21], whereas on the empirical side they recorded the way in which robot adoption reshapes local labor markets, most visibly in U.S. Manufacturing commuting zones, through displacement and reinstatement effects [24]. Autor and Dorn [23] contribute evidence that complements this, indicating that routine-biased technological change drives labor market polarization; in much the same way, Goos, Manning, and Salomons [26] strengthen that conclusion by showing how routine-task displacement acts as a structural force, one that operates independently of national institutional differences.

3.3. Global Value Chain Upgrading Theory

Global value chain theory takes up two questions: one is how production activities come to be distributed across national borders, and the other is what it is that determines a firm's position within these international production networks; Antràs and co-authors [20] supply the main analytical tools that speak to those questions—the upstreamness and downstreamness measures—which let researchers pin down, for instance, whether a Vietnamese garment factory sits upstream of a Western retailer, with a fair degree of accuracy.

Through two distinct upgrading pathways, digital technologies are able to move a firm's position within global value chains; on the one hand, product upgrading drives firms toward segments that carry higher value, whereas process upgrading raises the operational efficiency of the activities they already carry out [11,12]; on the other hand, an asymmetry worth flagging is that the digital capabilities called for by export expansion are not always the same as those required for advanced import sourcing.

3.4. Total Factor Productivity Theory

Why focus on total factor productivity? Because it captures, in one metric, how efficiently all inputs-labor, capital, materials, energy-are used together. It is the standard test for whether digital investments genuinely improve efficiency or merely swap one input for another. Several studies have sharpened our understanding. Corrado, Haskel, and Jona-Lasinio [25] show that ICT capital generates spillovers that boost productivity beyond what investing firms capture for themselves. Brynjolfsson and Hitt [5] add a crucial caveat: those spillovers depend on complementary organizational co-investment. Pan et al. [17] confirm the pattern at the macro level, using Chinese provincial data to show that digitalization drives productivity through technological progress, better resource allocation, and scale economies. At the firm level, Wu et al. [6] introduce a refinement worth noting: the effect is not linear. It exhibits threshold behavior, with infrastructure quality and IP protection acting as necessary conditions.

4. Review of Empirical Literature

4.1. Digital Economy and Total Factor Productivity

The link between digitalization and productivity has been studied across several levels of aggregation; at the firm level, the evidence put forward by Brynjolfsson and Hitt [5] suggests that computerization makes a positive contribution to output growth, and what stands out is that this contribution grows considerably larger once five-to-seven-year horizons are reached, since the complementary organizational adjustments need time before they come into effect. Pan and colleagues [17] carry the analysis to the regional level and characterize the digital economy as a systemic driver of TFP, one that works through technological progress, better allocative efficiency, and economies of scale; at the sector level, Corrado, Haskel, and Jona-Lasinio [25] report that ICT capital spillovers are concentrated to a disproportionate degree in digitally intensive industries, a finding that points to marked cross-sector heterogeneity in absorptive capacity.

Wu, Wang, and Wood [6], for example, use machine learning on the annual reports of Chinese publicly traded manufacturers and find a sizable TFP premium for digitally intensive firms, one that survives a battery of endogeneity tests. Tang and associates [7] largely confirm this result, but with a notable difference: their identification strategy attributes the TFP effect mainly to innovation-related activities, such as R&D and patenting, rather than to straightforward capital deepening, which implies that simply pouring money into technology without complementary investments in innovation capacity is unlikely to produce sustainable gains. Miró-Pérez, González-Reyes, and Torrent-Sellens [8] add another perspective through environmental innovation; their evidence suggests that digitalization and green innovation are complementary productivity drivers, although they caution that the latter impose short-run adjustment costs that may temporarily obscure the picture.

4.2. Digital Transformation and Manufacturing Innovation

Digitalization affects innovation processes in numerous ways; Nambisan and colleagues [9] provide a broad reconceptualization, arguing that in a digitally saturated environment, the architecture of innovation and entrepreneurship—who engages in it, how it is organized, and what forms it takes—changes fundamentally, while at a more operational level, Dalenogare et al. [29] surveyed industrial firms and found that big data analytics and cloud computing are expected to bring the largest performance improvements among Industry 4.0 technologies, larger enterprises consistently report higher expected gains than smaller firms. What explains this shift in where innovative activity occurs? Autor, Levy, and Murnane [2] offer a task-level answer; as computers take over routine cognitive and manual work, workers are pushed toward non-routine functions, such as diagnosing problems, creative synthesis, and working

with others, which are the raw material for innovation, and Tang et al. [7] tested this logic with quantitative data, showing that the innovation channel-operating through R&D investment and patent generation-is the main mediator linking digitalization to TFP growth.

4.3. Digital Technologies and Global Value Chains

A growing number of studies examine the intersection between digitalization and global value chains; Antràs et al. [20] developed upstreamness and downstreamness indices, tools that lay the methodological foundations for pinpointing exactly where firms sit within global production networks, and Banga [11] then applied these indices to Indian manufacturing, finding a notable result: digital leaders produce goods roughly 4 to 5 percent more sophisticated than firms that lag behind. This gap is not trivial, and it suggests digitalization may help firms escape what GVC scholars call 'low-end lock-in'.

Añón Higón et al. [12] offer a finer-grained perspective by breaking the GVC effects down according to the kind of digital investment that is involved; drawing on data from Spanish manufacturers, they pick out two separate pathways-one in which ICT investments chiefly back export-market expansion by letting firms reach new customers and adapt their products for varied markets, while the other sees automation investments working mainly through the import channel by allowing firms to source intermediate inputs of higher quality. The strategic lesson that follows: firms that aim for export-led upgrading would do well to give priority to ICT capabilities, whereas those looking for gains on the input side ought to concentrate on automation.

Luo et al. [13] take a capability-based angle, splitting the TFP effects of digital transformation into two mediating capabilities: innovation capability, that is, the capacity to generate novelty, and reconfiguration capability, that is, the ability to recombine resources when the environment shifts; this reading is in line with Teece's [27] dynamic-capabilities framework, which maintains that the ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure resources is what sets apart the firms that prosper amid technological disruption from those that fail to do so, and Agrawal, Gans, and Goldfarb [28] carry this reasoning through to the AI era, demonstrating that the automation of prediction changes at a basic level the relative value attached to human judgment and decision-making skills.

4.4. Industry 4.0 and Smart Manufacturing Technologies

Zhong and his collaborators [14] give us a pretty comprehensive rundown of the technical side: cyber-physical systems, IoT infrastructure, cloud platforms, big data analytics. Thoben, Wiesner, and Wuest [15] look at this from a cross-national angle, comparing smart manufacturing strategies in Germany, the US, Japan, and South Korea. Jimeno-Morenilla et al. [19] ask a pretty practical question: how can traditional manufacturing sectors actually implement these technologies? Frank and coauthors [16] bridge the gap between the technology side and the business model side. They identify three different ways servitization and Industry 4.0 can combine, each with its own value proposition and capability requirements.

5. Core Mechanisms of Digital Economy Empowering Manufacturing Integration

The theoretical and empirical strands brought together above show that digitalization does not remake manufacturing through any single channel, but rather by way of a number of interrelated pathways; at the very base of this structure sits factor restructuring whereas the remaining four elements-efficiency, innovation, GVC upgrading, and policy-function more like transmitters and moderators, in that they determine the manner and the extent to which those effects come to unfold across the sector.

5.1. Factor Restructuring Mechanism

Factor restructuring is the foundation of our five-mechanism framework. We start with the cost-side logic that Goldfarb and Tucker [1] laid out so clearly. Digital technology, as they point out, systematically lowers the costs of search, replication, transportation, tracking, and verification-and that frees up production factors to be recombined in novel ways. What's particularly important here is the emergence of data as a production factor in its own right, something genuinely distinct from traditional capital and labor. Unlike physical inputs, data is non-rivalrous: one firm using it doesn't leave less for another. Combine that with increasing-returns dynamics, and you get a sharp departure from earlier paradigms built around exploiting physical resources. Digital connectivity adds yet another dimension, since it enables real-time coordination of production spread across different locations-something that would have been hard to imagine two decades ago.

Acemoglu and Restrepo [4] provide the microfoundations for this mechanism through their task-based framework; in their account, automation reshuffles the task structure, which in turn changes the relative productivity of different factor bundles, and the labor displaced from automated tasks is not simply eliminated but is offset, at least partially, by new demand in emerging activities, by direct productivity gains, and by the capital accumulation that automation induces, with the extent of offset depending on the pace of new task creation.

Brynjolfsson and Hitt [5] lend additional empirical backing to yet another point: the full productivity gains that come with factor restructuring do not arrive on their own, since what is needed are complementary organizational investments-among them flattening hierarchies, retraining workers, and redesigning processes-and the evidence they present shows that this should not be treated as a plug-and-play fix, but instead as a systemic reorganization that has to be carried out across the firm.

At the macro level, Pan et al. [17] corroborate this, showing that digital economy development reshapes factor allocation across industries and regions, improving how well labor, capital, and technology match up-both within firms and between them.

5.2. Efficiency Enhancement Mechanism

Wu et al. [6] break this down into three sub-channels: supply chain management, human capital optimization, and digital innovation enhancement. Supply chain management tends to benefit first, and real-time information sharing and predictive analytics cut coordination costs and inventory requirements pretty significantly. Then there's the human capital side, where AI-assisted workforce planning and digital training tighten the match between worker skills and task demands. And digital innovation enhancement does its part by speeding up process improvement through digital twins, simulation, rapid prototyping. But here's the thing: their threshold analysis found an important interaction. The marginal productivity gain from better supply chain management is substantially larger when firms have also invested in human capital optimization. That tells us digital efficiency improvements aren't additive-they're multiplicative.

Luo et al. [13] take a more strategic angle, arguing that the efficiency gains from digital transformation hinge on which organizational capabilities are activated, and this depends on the type of investment being made; when digital transformation is broad and spans multiple functions, innovation capability, or the ability to generate novel outputs, plays the central role, but if the transformation is deep and limited to specific functions, reconfiguration capability, or the ability to recombine resources in response to environmental changes, becomes the key mediator. This distinction is not purely theoretical and has practical significance, because the appropriate digital strategy depends on whether a firm's competitive advantage rests on exploration (innovation) or exploitation (reconfiguration); Miró-Pérez et al. [8] add a further point, noting that digital efficiency gains are amplified when paired with eco-innovation,

although environmental investments involve short-run adjustment costs that may temporarily hide the benefits.

5.3. Innovation Empowerment Mechanism

Digital technologies do more than speed things up or cut costs; they change what innovation is. Nambisan and his co-authors [10] identify four properties that set digital innovation apart: convergence blurs product-service boundaries, generativity means technologies can produce unprompted change through recombination, heterogeneity implies extreme diversity in outputs, and distributed agency means innovation emerges from networks rather than just individual firms. Taken together, these properties lower the marginal cost of experimentation while vastly expanding the combinatorial space for discovering new solutions; the net effect is more innovation, but also greater volatility and unpredictability in what actually emerges.

Tang and colleagues [7] test this mechanism using panel data and find that digital transformation significantly increases both R&D intensity and invention patent output; their results indicate that innovation, rather than capital deepening or labor shedding, constitutes the primary pathway through which digitalization raises TFP. Autor, Levy, and Murnane [2] provide the micro-level rationale: as digital technologies automate routine cognitive and manual tasks, they free up human cognitive resources for non-routine activities-problem framing, creative synthesis, cross-domain recombination-that are the essential inputs to genuine innovation. This task-level reallocation may represent the most consequential long-run effect of digitalization on manufacturing, even though it is considerably harder to measure than short-run productivity gains.

5.4. Value Chain Upgrading Mechanism

The value chain upgrading mechanism is about the way digitalization changes the positions held by manufacturing firms inside global production networks; Banga [11] looks at Indian manufacturers and splits the effects into two principal channels-product sophistication and process upgrading. Digitally advanced firms turn out goods that are roughly 4 to 5 percent more sophisticated than those made by their less-digital peers, and the difference can decide whether a firm remains locked in low-value assembly work or shifts into higher-value segments of the value chain.

Añón Higón and his collaborators [12] add some nuance to this. They split GVC effects by the type of digital investment, and what emerges are two quite different pathways. ICT investments? They mainly support export-market expansion-helping firms reach new customers and adapt products to diverse markets. Automation investments? Those work mostly through the import channel, letting firms source higher-quality intermediate inputs. The strategic takeaway is pretty straightforward: if you're going for export-led upgrading, prioritize ICT capabilities; if you're after better inputs, focus on automation. And Antràs et al. [20] give us the tools to actually measure all this-upstreamness and downstreamness indices-so researchers can track how firms shift along the value chain with a fair amount of precision.

5.5. Policy Enabling Mechanism

The fifth mechanism-policy enabling-is about the way institutional frameworks steer the course of digital-manufacturing integration; Wu and his colleagues [6] make this point, observing that solid IP protection raises the productivity returns from digital transformation by a substantial margin, whereas firms placed in weak-IP environments-think of a contract manufacturer whose process innovations get copied by neighbors within months-end up capturing markedly less value from their digitization efforts, even when genuine money is being committed to them.

Wu et al. [6] bring to light yet another point as well: the quality of regional digital infrastructure works as a kind of threshold, and when the external infrastructure happens to be inadequate,

firms reap essentially no productivity gains from the digital spending they carry out internally, no matter how large the sum invested may be; the policy lesson that follows is that putting money into shared digital infrastructure can yield higher social returns than would come from subsidizing the adoption choices made by individual firms.

Jimeno-Morenilla and his co-authors [19] take up a question that the broad policy prescriptions in circulation tend to pass over: namely, how traditional manufacturing sectors can get past the barriers. These firms run up against a triple constraint, made up of limited financial capacity, unfamiliarity with digital technologies, and skill shortages, and Jimeno-Morenilla et al. [19] contend that the interventions which work best are technology demonstration projects, shared infrastructure facilities, and targeted skills training.

Thoben, Wiesner, and Wuest [15] adopt a wider angle by setting smart manufacturing programs from a number of countries-Germany's Industrie 4.0 and China's manufacturing-upgrading agenda being two familiar cases-side by side; they report that the policy mixes which work best bring together technology-push measures-among them R&D support, technology transfer, and public research infrastructure-with demand-pull instruments, such as procurement standards, industry coordination platforms, and digital vouchers for SMEs. What matters most is the combination itself rather than any single instrument taken on its own; push measures by themselves yield solutions in search of problems, and pull measures on their own are unable to get past the coordination failures that hold back diffusion.

6. Critical Assessment of the Literature

6.1. Established Contributions

Despite the gaps I will turn to in a moment, there are several points on which scholars broadly agree. One is empirical: across different countries, time periods, and empirical strategies, researchers consistently find that digital transformation boosts manufacturing TFP [6, 7, 8, 13]-and this result holds up under various endogeneity tests. A second point of agreement concerns transmission channels. The five mechanisms we have elaborated, while their interactions remain unexplored, all rest on solid theoretical foundations and enjoy empirical support. A third area of consensus: heterogeneity. The productivity effects are not uniform; they vary systematically with ownership type, technological intensity, and regional context [6, 7]. The theoretical toolkit has grown considerably more sophisticated. Perez's [3] macro-historical framework, Acemoglu and Restrepo's [4] task-based micro-analytics, and Goldfarb and Tucker's [1] cost-reduction logic are now increasingly seen as complementary rather than competing.

6.2. Research Gaps

I see three areas where the literature falls short, and each deserves more sustained attention than it has received.

First, there is the theory gap: Perez [3] provides a broad account of techno-economic paradigm shifts, showing how clusters of radical innovations, new infrastructure, and institutional adaptations periodically remake entire economies, while Goldfarb and Tucker [1] offer a micro-level framework focused on digital cost reduction. These two levels of analysis remain parallel, and the causal chain linking economy-wide digital diffusion to sectoral convergence has never been clearly established; this is not an abstract concern, because without a clear theory of how paradigm shifts translate into convergence dynamics, policymakers cannot reliably distinguish between interventions that simply accelerate technology uptake and those that support genuine paradigm transitions through institutional and organizational change.

Second, the interaction gap. Section 5 sets the five mechanisms apart, each carrying its own empirical literature, yet the researchers almost always look at them one at a time, concentrating

on a channel or two while the others are left aside; as a result, very little is known about whether innovation empowerment gets amplified once it is combined with factor restructuring, or about whether value chain upgrading rests on earlier efficiency gains. This matter carries weight, because when these mechanisms reinforce one another, taking them up separately will play down their joint significance and push firms toward underinvesting in the combinations that actually pay off, whereas when they stand in for each other, firms could well be pouring resources into redundant capability building.

Third, the context gap. Studies of heterogeneity point out that the effects of digitalization differ across ownership structures, industries, and regions [6,7] yet these studies are largely descriptive, in that they merely show the effects to be different without saying why; the mechanisms through which contextual factors-market structure, labor market institutions, financial development-come to shape integration outcomes stay poorly understood. What is also absent is any genuine grasp of how integration processes change as time goes on; taking the stage taxonomy put forward by Thoben et al. [15], moving from adoption to reconfiguration to ecosystem remodeling, what are the obstacles, transition conditions, and capability thresholds that tell success apart from stalemate? These are not questions that cross-sectional regressions can settle, and yet settling them is essential.

7. Future Research Directions

Closing these gaps will take a coordinated effort across five fronts.

What is called for is a unified analytical framework that links productivity paradigm transformation with industry convergence, weaving Perez's [3] historical-structural perspective, Acemoglu and Restrepo's [4] task-based micro-foundations, and Goldfarb and Tucker's [1] cost-analytic approach into one causal narrative; this same framework should also follow the arc that runs from economy-wide diffusion, by way of sectoral convergence and firm-level restructuring, all the way down to task-level recomposition.

Mechanism interaction models stand as the most pressing empirical task at present; methods such as structural equation modeling, system dynamics, and qualitative comparative analysis all hold real promise. A sensible place to begin is with the hypothesis that the Section 5 analysis points to-that factor restructuring serves as the foundation and reinforces the other four mechanisms; what this calls for is longitudinal, firm-level data that capture not merely whether firms have undergone digital transformation, but also which mechanisms they set in motion in what order, and with what effects of interaction.

Contextual conditions. Wu et al. [6] showed IP protection matters. We need to extend that logic to other institutional dimensions-labor market flexibility, financial development, regulatory quality-and examine how they interact. Cross-country comparative designs exploiting institutional variation could tell us a great deal about preconditions for success.

Dynamic models. We need to capture the evolutionary character of integration. Longitudinal case studies tracking firms through successive stages, supplemented by panel data methods that identify stage transitions-this would address limitations cross-sectional designs cannot overcome.

Sustainability. Building on Miró-Pérez et al. [8], we should treat sustainability not as an afterthought but as integral from the start. How can digitalization simultaneously advance productivity, environmental performance, and social outcomes-rather than treating these as separate problems to be solved independently?

8. Conclusion

Let me draw three conclusions from this review.

First, the shift is not merely a matter of technological upgrading; it stands as a genuine paradigm transition, and it is built on three pillars: data as a production factor with non-rivalrous and increasing-returns properties; the dependence of digital productivity gains on complementary organizational co-investments; and the rise of platform-based value creation that reaches across traditional sectoral boundaries. This paradigm lens, drawing on Perez, Acemoglu and Restrepo, and Goldfarb and Tucker, provides a more comprehensive analytical platform than the narrower technology-adoption frameworks.

Second, and this is pretty remarkable, the literature converges on five mechanisms: factor restructuring, efficiency enhancement, innovation empowerment, value chain upgrading, and policy enabling. Each one has credible evidence behind it. Factor restructuring is foundational—it reconfigures the task composition of production and establishes data as a legitimate input. The other three (efficiency, innovation, value chain upgrading) act as transmission pathways, turning that foundational restructuring into observable outcomes. The policy mechanism sets the institutional context.

Three critical gaps are still left open: the theoretical connection between paradigm transformation and industry convergence remains weak; work on the way mechanisms interact is almost entirely missing; contextual boundary conditions and evolutionary dynamics keep being passed over. The five-point agenda put forward—theoretical framework development, interaction modeling, contextual investigation, dynamic process analysis, sustainability integration—points to a productive way forward for scholars, firms, and policymakers.

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