Study of the Impact of the Short-Selling Mechanism on Audit Fees

Authors

  • Yanran Yu Sichuan Agricultural University, Dujiangyan, Sichuan 611800, China

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54691/0tgcav31

Keywords:

Short-selling Mechanism; Audit Fees; Difference-in-Differences Model; Audit Risk; Quasi-natural Experiment.

Abstract

In recent years, the short-selling mechanism has had an important influence on corporate financing, corporate governance, and audit behavior. Utilizing the 2010 launch of China's margin trading and short-selling pilot as a quasi-natural experiment, a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) framework was utilized to investigate a cohort of A-share non-financial firms spanning 2009 to 2021. Our findings indicate that audit costs tend to be elevated within short-selling frameworks; this mainly stems from heightened audit risks and a broader scope of professional duties. In supplementary heterogeneity examinations, it was observed that the amplifying effect on expenditures is more significant for non-state-owned firms, organizations with a reduced degree of accounting conservatism, and those reviewed by non-Big Four auditing firms. The aforementioned outcomes provide theoretical foundations for optimizing the securities lending architecture and reinforce audit risk evaluations.

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References

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Published

2026-09-25

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Articles