Review and Response to the Non-Commercial Assistance Provisions in the CPTPP
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.6981/FEM.202504_6(4).0020Keywords:
CPTPP; Non-commercial Assistance; SCM Agreement; Competitive Neutrality.Abstract
The non-commercial assistance provisions under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership introduce adjustments to existing international subsidy rules, establishing the first international trade framework specifically regulating state-owned enterprise subsidies. Compared to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, these provisions eliminate the identification procedures for "public bodies" and redefine the criteria for determining "specificity" of subsidies. This legal evolution may constrain the Chinese government's ability to provide subsidies through SOEs, hinder the development of SOEs in service trade and cross-border investment sectors, and weaken China's influence in negotiating new international trade rules. To address challenges posed by these provisions, China should implement competitive neutrality policies by preventing cross-subsidization and legislating equal subsidy access rights for enterprises of all ownership types, while enhancing transparency regarding SOE subsidy disclosures.
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