The Impact of the Synergy between the Carbon Market and Green Credit on Green Innovation in Steel Enterprises

Benyong Dai

doi:10.54691/gs2tjd81

Authors

Benyong Dai

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54691/gs2tjd81

Keywords:

Steel Industry; Green Transition; Green Credit; Carbon Trading Market; Evolutionary Game; Synergistic Mechanism.

Abstract

Under the "Dual Carbon" goals, this paper examines the synergy between green credit and carbon markets in driving the steel industry's green transition. Using a tripartite evolutionary game model (government, banks, enterprises) and numerical simulations, we find that carbon price is the core driver, with effects varying non-linearly: low prices require strong government intervention; medium prices benefit from complementary low-interest financing; and high prices make green innovation an economic necessity, reducing policy marginal utility. We recommend establishing a rising carbon price mechanism, strengthening early-stage financial guidance, and shifting towards institutional optimization as the market matures.

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