Cooperative Solutions in Double-Star Network Games
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54691/5351wr41Keywords:
Double-star model; The Shapley value; Multi-agent system.Abstract
This paper investigates a game model known as the dual-star system, a type of multi-agent system. The study examines two-level games within such systems, where the first level represents external interactions and the second level involves internal strategic decisions. We propose a method for distributing benefits to agents in both levels. By constructing characteristic functions for the dual-star model, we establish Shapley values as the natural optimal principle for benefit allocation in both tiers of the game.
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