Applying the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Data Monopolies in the AI Era: EU Experience and Implications for China

Kezao Yang

doi:10.54691/e2cjhp60

Authors

Kezao Yang

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54691/e2cjhp60

Keywords:

Essential Facilities Doctrine; Data Monopolies; Artificial Intelligence.

Abstract

In the era of artificial intelligence, acquiring high-quality datasets is crucial for model training and development. However, dominant enterprises may monopolise critical data and thereby abuse their market dominance. This paper explores the applicability of the Essential Facilities Doctrine (EFD) in the context of data monopolies. This research reveals how EU case law has progressively clarified the criteria for applying EFD to intangible assets, particularly evident in cases such as Magill, Bronner, IMS Health, Microsoft, and Android Auto. In contrast, although China's Anti-Monopoly Law and policy guidelines recognise certain elements of EFD, judicial practice remains conservative in explicitly adopting the principle, as demonstrated by the Qihoo v. Tencent case. Chinese scholars hold divergent views on whether this legal doctrine can be extended to the data domain. This paper recommends drawing upon EU experience: defining critical data through stringent criteria, balancing data acquisition with privacy safeguards, and formulating approaches aligned with China's data sovereignty strategy. Ultimately, it advocates for regulating data monopoly practices in the artificial intelligence sector through prudent and progressive legal development.

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