Path Deduction and Countermeasure Analysis of Tunneling Behavior of Major Shareholders of ST Protruly Company

Tian Huang; Gaoqian Xing

doi:10.54691/bcpbm.v13i.55

Authors

Tian Huang
Gaoqian Xing

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v13i.55

Keywords:

Tunneling Behavior; Information Disclosure; Corporate Governance.

Abstract

In recent years, China's listed companies make use of the defects of the information disclosure system, using direct or indirect means such as the appropriation of enterprise funds to carry out large tunneling cases are frequently exposed. Based on ST Protruly company, this paper analyzes the path of its major shareholders to implement the hollowed out behavior from the four perspectives: large prepaid accounts, large accounts receivable, large illegal guarantee and huge foreign investment, and then puts forward the measures to restrain the hollowed out behavior of major shareholders of ST Protruly company.

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