Are Enforceable Undertakings A “Cop Out” for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission?

Authors

  • Jingyi Yu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.6918/IJOSSER.202504_8(4).0046

Keywords:

Enforceable Undertakings; ASIC; ACCC.

Abstract

Enforcement undertakings (EUs) have become a widely used regulatory enforcement tool in Australia, particularly by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).EUs were originally designed to provide an efficient and collaborative approach to compliance, offering regulators a flexible alternative to litigation. However, ASIC's increasing use of EUs has sparked debate as to whether they represent a pragmatic enforcement mechanism or a means for firms to avoid more severe penalties. This paper examines ASIC's reliance on EUs, compares its approach to that of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), and assesses the effectiveness, deterrence and transparency of EUs as a regulatory tool. While the EU can lead to faster resolution of issues and improved compliance measures, concerns about its leniency, lack of punitive effect and opaque enforcement raise questions about its effectiveness. By analyzing the EU's strengths and limitations, this paper proposes measures to improve its regulatory effectiveness, including stronger rules, greater transparency, and a balanced integration of the EU and litigation to ensure greater public confidence and regulatory accountability.

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References

[1] Richard Johnstone and Michelle King, ‘“A Responsive Sanction to Promote Systematic Compliance?: Enforceable Undertakings in Occupational Health and Safety Regulation’ (2008) 21(3) Australian Journal of Labour Law 280.

[2] Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 1992 (Cth) (‘TPLA Bill’).

[3] Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth), ss 93AA(3), 93A(3) (‘ASIC Act’).

[4] Senate Economics References Committee, Performance of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (June 2014) 275 (‘SERC Report’).

[5] ASIC, ‘Former Kleenmaid Directors Ordered to Stand Trial’ (2014) 14 Media Release 64.

[6] UNSW, THE GENERAL DETERRENCE EFFECTS of ENFORCEABLE UNDERTAKINGS on FINANCIAL SERVICES and CREDIT PROVIDERS (UNSW Report, 25 October 2018) 14 (‘UNSW Report’).

[7] Michael Legg, Olivia Dixon and Stephen Speirs, Corporate Misconduct & White-Collar Crime in Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2022).

[8] Marina Nehme, ‘Enforceable undertakings’ practices across Australian regulators: lessons learned’ (2020) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 23.

[9] Section 87B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2014.

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Published

2025-03-11

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Yu, Jingyi. 2025. “Are Enforceable Undertakings A ‘Cop Out’ for the Australian Securities and Investments Commission?”. International Journal of Social Science and Education Research 8 (4): 408-16. https://doi.org/10.6918/IJOSSER.202504_8(4).0046.