Remodeling of International Regimes in Neoliberal Institutionalism Perspective: Case Study of the South China Sea Arbitration
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54691/bcpssh.v21i.3656Keywords:
Neoliberal Institutionalism; International regimes; Complex interdependence theory; South China Sea Arbitration; China-Philippines arbitration.Abstract
Among the various disputes in the South China Sea, the China-Philippines arbitration case embodies the legalization of international conflict resolution. However, after the ruling was issued, China viewed it as a “scrap of paper,” and the Philippines had no intention of restraining China through the ruling. International law is considered a “paper tiger” due to the lack of mandatory enforcement, and international regimes were once seen as dysfunctional and chaotic systems. Then both China and the Philippines put bilateral relations back on track through economic diplomacy and negotiations. It is clear that sovereignty is at the core of maintaining international law and regimes, but it does not mean that states can adopt the principle of “self-help”. How can international regimes be reshaped to be flexible and resilient, and how can a virtuous model of balances between state power and international regimes be achieved in future international conflict resolution? To answer these questions, this study will explore the possibility of transforming and reshaping international regimes, using neoliberal institutionalism as a logical starting point and complex interdependence theory as a model framework. International regimes are not a means for the weaker states to achieve their claims; achieving a win-win situation in economic and power reciprocity is the most direct way to resolve disputes over the South China Sea, and the resilience of international regimes is reflected by expanding from bilateral to multilateral models of shared governance in the South China Sea through alliance politics and economic diplomacy.
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