Analysis of the Causes of the Iraq War from Rationalism Perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54691/bcpssh.v16i.512Keywords:
Iraq War; Rationalism Perspective; Non-rationalist Perspective.Abstract
The causes of the Iraq war can be analyzed from both non-rationalism and rationalism. This essay will discuss that the rationalist framework can give a more suitable insight into the purpose and reason driving these states to act. First of all, for the definition of the rationalist framework, it assumes the actors acting rationally. This essay will outline the Iraq War and analyze its reasons from rationalism, resulting in three main causes, power transition, uncertainty and expected value. All of them would lead to the same outcome, preventive war. On the other hand, this essay will discuss the Non-rationalist analysis and I will oppose these explanations to conclude that rationalism can provide a more accurate explanation.
Downloads
References
Lawrence Freedman. War in Iraq: Selling the Threat. Survival 2004. 46 (2):7–49.
Information on: Wikipedia. 2017. Iraq War. www.wikipedia.org.
Information on: Wikipedia. 2017. Rationale for the Iraq War.www.wikipedia.org.
Information on: Wikipedia. 2017. Rationale for the Iraq War.www.wikipedia.org.
Information on: Wikipedia. 2017. Rationale for the Iraq War.www.wikipedia.org.
Kim, W. and Morrow, J. 1992. When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?. American Journal of Political Science, 36(4), pp.896.
Debs, A. and Monteiro, N. P. 2014. Known Unknowns: Power Shifts, Uncertainty, and War, International Organization. Cambridge University Press, 68(1), pp. 1–31.
Goerge Bush. The preface in The National Security Strategy of America of American [R/OL]. [2002-09-17].
Iriye, A. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 by Ron Suskind. Political Science Quarterly, 2007.122(3), pp.481-482.
Matthew O. Jackson, and Massimo Morelli. 2009. Strategic Militarization, Deterrence, and Wars. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 4 (4):279–313.
Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80.
Iriye, A. 2007. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11 by Ron Suskind. Political Science Quarterly, 122(3), pp.481-482.
Muhamet A. Bas, and Andrew J. Coe. 2012. Arms Diffusion and War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (4): 651–74.
Information on: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/16099-document-07-cable-amembassy-seoul-6928.
Information on: http://www.military-today.com/artillery/m1978_koksan.htm.
Robert Ayson, and Brendan Taylor. Attacking North Korea: Why War Might Be Preferred. Comparative Strategy 2004.23 (3):263–79.
Information on: Wikipedia. 2017. Gulf War.www.wikipedia.org.
Jack S. Levy. Preventive War and Democratic Politics. International Studies Quarterly 2008.52(1):1–24.
Information on: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040712-5.html.
Mitchell, D. and Massoud, T., Anatomy of Failure: Bush’s Decision-Making Process and the Iraq War. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2009.5(3), pp.265-286.
Wright, R. How 'Confirmation Bias' Can Lead to War. The Atlantic.2017.
Paul R. Pillar. "Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq", 2006, p. 18.
Freedman, L. and Woodward, B., Plan of Attack. Foreign Affairs, 2004.83(5), p.170.
Xue Chen. Social Psychology, Misperceptions, and the Transformation and Practice of American Security Concepts,2006. p. 10.
Information on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/an-unnecessary-war-2.
Mearsheimer, J. and Walt, S, Can Saddam be Contained? History Says Yes. Foreign Policy Bulletin, 2003. 14 (1), pp.219-224.
Barry R. Posen. US Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World or: What If Iraq Had Had Nuclear Weapons? Security Studies,1997. 6(3):1–31.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
How to Cite
