Quality of Internal Controls, Management Compensation and Corporate Surplus Management
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v49i.5433Keywords:
quality of internal controls; management compensation levels; surplus management.Abstract
After enterprises enter high-quality development, the quality of corporate accounting information has received attention from all walks of life, and the internal control of enterprises and the salary level of management play a crucial role. Based on the perspective of management's salary level, the relationship between internal control quality and corporate surplus management is empirically investigated with a sample of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021. What’s more, the contribution of management's salary level to internal control and corporate surplus management is studied through a moderating effect model, and the robustness of the relationship is verified through multiple testing models. The empirical results show that the quality of internal control can significantly inhibit the accrual surplus management behavior and the real surplus management behavior of enterprises and improve the quality of accounting information and decision usefulness, and the higher the level of management compensation, the better the inhibiting effect of internal control on the surplus management behavior of enterprises.
Downloads
References
Gong Yifei,Xie Yuanfang. Study on the impact of internal control deficiencies and rectification on surplus persistence: Empirical evidence from A-share listed companies. Accounting Research.No.05,p.75-82
Fang Hongxing,Jin Yuna. Can high quality internal control inhibit surplus management? --An empirical study based on voluntary internal control assurance reports. Accounting Research.No.08,p.53-60+96.
Xiao H, Zhang GQ. Internal Control Quality, Surplus Persistence and Firm Value[J]. Accounting Research.No.05,p.73-80+96.
Zhao X., Zhang X. Internal control, executive power and M&A performance: empirical evidence from the Chinese securities market[J]. Nankai Management Review.Vol.16(2013) No.02,p.75-81.
Chi, G.,Lou, X. Y.. Internal control, government audit and accounting information quality - based on data of listed central enterprises from 2012-2016[J]. Friends of Accounting.No.09,p.19-25.
Jia L. Internal control, supplier relationship and surplus management[J]. Friends of Accounting.No.12,p.83-91.
Lu, R., Liu, J., Xu, N.. Internal control, property rights and executive compensation performance sensitivity[J]. Accounting Research.No.10,p.42-48+96.
Lu D,Wang YC,Fu P. Do CEO incentives improve internal control effectiveness? --Empirical evidence from state-owned listed companies[J]. Accounting Research.No.06,p.66-72+97.
Pan Hongbo,Han Fangfang. Vertical concurrent senior management, nature of property rights and accounting information quality[J]. Accounting Research.No.07,p.19-26+96.
Yu, H. Z., Ding, L., Xie, Xuan, et al. Internal control disclosure, market evaluation and surplus information content[J]. Audit Research.No.05,p.87-95.
Wang Yunqian, Wang Yonghai. Can the CFO also serve as the secretary of the board of directors to improve the quality of accounting information? [J]. Accounting Research.No.08,p.32-39.






