Factors Influencing Executive Compensation in the Automobile Industry in the US

Yilin Liu

doi:10.54691/bcpbm.v28i.2218

Authors

Yilin Liu

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v28i.2218

Keywords:

Executive compensation; revenue; US automobile industry.

Abstract

In modern management, executive compensation can exert a substantial impact on the operation and profitability of an organization. This research explores the factors influencing executive compensation in the automobile industry in the United States. It aims to identify the relationship between a set of specific factors, including revenue, earnings per share and return on net assets (RONA) and compensation of executives. The data were selected based on the fiscal year 2021. With the findings and results, it is revealed that executive compensation is significantly related with revenue and earnings per share of a company without a significant relationship with return on net assets. Based on the results, several recommendations are proposed to better engage executives and improve corporate performance.

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