The Association Between U.S. Technology Company's Performance and Non-employee Director's Compensation Policy

Authors

  • Yihua Jin
  • Gefei Xie
  • Bailin Zhou

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v28i.2231

Keywords:

Quantitative research; Pattern; Net profit; Stock award; Cash retainer.

Abstract

Directors’ compensation policies are one of the strategies that the firm's management team and shareholders have of great concern over. Some research shows that policies have a specific association with the individual company’s performance. However, this still lacks a unified explanation. Therefore, the research theme of this paper is the relationship between non-employee directors’ compensation policies and the firm’s performance. This study examined the data public by SEC and PayScale and focused on four U.S technology companies: Meta (Facebook), Twitter, Splunk, and Akamai. The study compares the impact of different compensation policies on these four companies operating capacity, revenue capacity, and stock price. After researched the performance of these four technology companies, the result showed that compensation policy for non-employee directors may have a particular impact on a firm's revenue and its stock price, but the study also showed the impact is not significant because the correlation is a failure in some years for these four companies.

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Published

2022-10-14